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UNLOCKING THE iPHONE: HOW
ANTITRUST LAW CAN SAVE CONSUMERS
FROM THE INADEQUACIES OF
COPYRIGHT LAW
Abstract: In 2007, George Hotz circumvented the software lock on his
iPhone that prevented him from using the device on a wireless network
other than AT&T's. When oilier Phone purchasers similarly freed them-
selves from AT&T's service, Apple responded by using a software update
to disable the altered iPhones. This back-and-forth between consumers
and Apple raises two important questions: can consumers legally unlock
their iPhones, and, if so, under what body of law? Although an exemption
to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (the "DMCA") appears to allow
consumers to circumvent cell phone locks under copyright law, the regu-
lation is of little practical use to consumers seeking to avoid AT&T's alleg-
edly inferior service. Instead, they should challenge the underlying busi-
ness arrangement between Apple and AT&T by arguing that tying the
purchase of the iPhone to AT&T's service violates Section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. This Note examines this argument and, in doing
so, illuminates the limitations of the DMCA and demonstrates how it en-
courages content providers to engage in anticompetitive behavior.
INTRODUCTION
In June 2007, Apple revolutionized public perception of cellular
telephones when it released the iPhone. 1
 Much more than just a port-
able telephone, the iPhone allows users to play music and movies, store
photos, and access the Internet, all through a colorful and convenient
touch screen. 2 Unfortunately for consumers, however, use of their
iPhones is conditioned on their acceptance of a two-year service
agreement with wireless service provider AT&T.' For many consumers,
I See Thomas Crampton, Eating the iPhone, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A28; Thomas
Crampton, Much Ado About Apple's iPhone, N.Y. Tirsms, May 21, 2007, at C6; Jeremy W Pe-
ters, Gave tip Sleep and Maybe a First-Born, but at Least I Have an iPhone, N.Y. TIM Es, June 30,
2007, at C3.
2 See Apple iPhone Features. hup://www.apple.com/iphone/features/index.litml#
phone (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
3 iPhone Terms and Conditions, hup://www.wireless.aticomilearn/articles-resources/
iphone-termsjsp (last visited Jan. 2, 2008). Unlike purchasers of the original iPhone, pur-
chasers of Apple's SO iPhone, released on July 11, 2008, do not have to enter into mandatory
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this forced marriage with AT&T is annoying and inconvenient; many
complain that AT&T's service suffers from inadequate coverage and
spotty reception.4 To protect its arrangement with AT&T and to ensure
that iPhone purchasers do not use another service provider, however,
Apple installed a technological device on all iPhones that "locks" the
device into AT&T's network and blocks access to other nenvorks.5
In August 2007, with the help of a soldering gun, some obscure
software tools, and 500 hours of labor, seventeen-year-old George Hotz
solved this problem by "unlocking" his iPhone, allowing him to access
the network of one of AT&T's rival carriers, T-Mobile. 6 In the wake of
Hotz's accomplishment, software developers created and released user-
friendly software programs to help others repeat Hotz's end-around
and unlock their iPhones from AT&T's exclusive service.?
Unfortunately for consumers, iPhone unlocking did not go unno-
ticed by Apple. 8 When asked by a journalist whether unlocking was a
concern for his company, Apple CEO Steve Jobs answered, "[i] t's a con-
stant cat and mouse game. We try to stay ahead. People will try to break
in, and it's our job to stop them breaking in."9 Jobs stayed true to his
two-year service contracts with AT&T. Eric Benderoff, AT&T's Odd iPhone Offer, TEcHNEws-
Woutm, July 6, 2008, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/iphone/63683.htm]?welcome=
1216001752. Instead, they can pay a $400 premium for a contract-free iPhone and then pay
AT&T on a monthly basis. Id. Under this plan, users still cannot access a network other than
AT&T's. Id.
See Michelle Quinn, Shine Off Apple for Some Loyalists, Cm. This Oct. 14, 2007, § 5, at
3; Adam Silverman, Lure of iPhone Proves Too Strong for Some in Vermont, USA limns', Aug. 28,
2007, at 4B. Prior to the iPhone's release, one customer claimed, The ONLY thing halting
my purchase of an iPhone is AT&T's slow, last-generation wireless service [The]
iPhone gets a 10+, AT&T a 2 (maybe)." Leslie Brooks Suzukamo, High Stakes for AT&T, ST,
PAUL PIONEER PRESS (MLIIII.), June 23, 2007, at 1C.
5 See Cyrus Farivar, Locked vs. Unlocked: Opening Up Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov, 1, 2007, at
C9; Jennifer Granick, Legal or Not, iPhone Hacks Might Spur Revolution, WIRED, Aug. 28,
2007, http://www.wired.com/politicsionlinerights/commentary/circuitcourt/2007/08/
circuitcourt_0829; Tim Wu, The iPhone Freedom Fighters, SLATE, Oct. 4, 2007, Imp://
www.slate.com/id/2175304/pagenum/a11/#page_start.
6 Brad Stone, With Software and Soldering, AT&T's Lock on iPhone is Undone, N.Y. Todr.s,
Aug. 25, 2007, at Cl.
7 Id.
See e.g,, jacqui Cheng, Apple's Fight Against iPhone Unlocks May Result in Expensive Bricks,
Ans TECIINICA, Sept. 19, 2007, iittp://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070919-apples-fight-
against-iphone-unlocks-may-result-in-expensive-brickshtm; Gregg Keizer, Update: Apple Plays
Hardball: Upgrade Bricks' Unlocked iPhottes, C,omPuTERWormo, Sept. 27, 2007, http://www.
romputerworld.com/action/article.do?cortunand=viewArticleBasic&article 1d=9039479 [here-
inafter Keizer, Apple Plays Hardball].
9 Cheng, supra note 8; Gregg Keizer, Jobs Says Apple Will Fight iPhone Unlocking Hacks,
COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 18, 2007, http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?corn-
mand=viewArticleBasic&articleld=9037398&intsrc-=hm_list.
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word, eventually implementing a software update that disabled any
third-party software installed on a user's iPhone and that even rendered
some unlocked iPhones unusable."' Software developers countered by
vowing to combat Apple's update with new unlocking software."
In October 2007, iPhone purchasers sought recourse from the le-
gal system by filing two class action lawsuits against Apple and AT&T,
one in federal court and one in state court. 12 The suits claim that Apple
and AT&T are violating state and federal antitrust laws by barring ac-
cess to alternate wireless networks and interfering with the rights of
consumers to use freely and lawfully the product that they purchased."
Each suit seeks monetary damages exceeding $200 million, as well as
injunctions that would give iPhone purchasers the freedom to use their
devices wills the wireless network of their choice."
to Cheng, supra note 8. In addition to using software updates, Apple has also at-
tempted to curb unlocking (and the apparent reselling) of its iPhone by refusing to accept
cash for the product and only allowing each customer to purchase a maximum of two
iPhones. See Apple Limits Sale of iPhones: Two Per Person and No Cash, N.Y. Ttmr,s, Oct. 27,
2007, at C2.
11 Gregg Keizer, iPhone Unlock Hackers Promise to Fight Apple Updates, Cost etrrtatWotti.n,
Sept. 25, 2007, httpWwww.compitterworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticle
Baic&articleld=9038898 [hereinafter Keizer, iPhone Unlock Hackers].
12 See generally Complaint, Holman v. Apple, Inc., No. C07-05152 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5,
2007) [hereinafter Holman Complaint]; Complaint, Smith v. Apple, Inc., No. 1-07-CV-
095781 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Smith Complaint], Apple has also been
challenged in court for another allegedly unlawful tying arrangement related to its digital
rights management technology Sec generally Complaint, Tucker v. Apple Computer, Inc.,
No. C-06-4457 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 21, 2006); Nicola F. Sharpe & Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Is
Apple Playing Fair? Navigating the iPod FairPlay DR)t1 Controversy, 5 Nw. J. TEcii. Sc 1NTELL.
PROP. 332 (2007). Through its iTunes Music Store (ITNIS"), Apple sells downloadable
songs that have technological restrictions to prevent unauthorized copying. Sharpe &
Arewa, supra, at 333. This technology, called FairPlay, aims to protect the copyrighted
works by preventing consumers from loading iTMS songs onto portable digital music play-
ers other than the iPod. Id. Consequently, some have accused Apple of tying the purchase
of iTunes songs with the purchase of the iPod. See id.
15 See Holman Complaint, supra note 12, 1 1, at 1; Smith Complaint, supra note 12, 1 1,
at 5. Specifically, both lawsuits allege that Apple and AT&T have violated portions of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, as well as the Cartwright Act, California's state law counterpart to
the federal antitrust statute. See Holman Complaint, supra note 12, 1[1 76-97, at 17-22;
Smith Complaint, supra note 12, 11 117-135, at 39-41. The plaintiffs in Holman and Smith
have recently agreed to consolidate their cases in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California. See genemlly Joint Case Management Statement, In re Apple & AT&T
Antitrust Litig., No. 07-cv-5152-JW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2008).
14 See Holman Complaint, supra note 12, 1 1, at 1; Smith Complaint, supra note 12,
11 1-2, at 5. For each of the five counts waged against Apple and AT&T, the Holman Com-
plaint asks for at least $200 million. See Holman Complaint, supra note 12, 11 85, 93, 97,
102, at 19-23. The Smith Complaint asks for damages in the range of $280 million to $7.52
billion. See Smith Complaint, supra note 12, 1 6 at 53. Both complaints seek to enjoin Apple
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This Note evaluates the legal arguments available to consumers
who would like to purchase the iPhone without being locked into
AT&T's service. 15 To provide background for this claim, Part I of this
Note provides a brief overview of the cell phone industry; describes the
practice of cell phone locking, and examines the iPhone and the Ap-
ple-AT&T relationship. 19 Part II discusses the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act (the "DMCA"), which prohibits the circumvention of techno-
logical protection measures that control access to copyrighted material,
and examines whether unlocking the iPhone violates the DMCA." Part
III discusses the prohibition of certain "tying" arrangements and the
elements a plaintiff must prove to succeed in a claim under Section 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act. 19 Part IV examines whether an exemption
to the DMCA allows consumers to unlock the iPhone. 19 Finally, Part V
argues that a better argument for consumers is that Apple and AT&T
have imposed an illegal tying arrangement."
from selling the iPhone with any software lock. See Holman Complaint, supra note 12,1 6,
at 23-24; Smith Complaint, supra note 12,110, at 53.
15 See infra notes 214-307 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 21-79 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 80-144 and accompanying text. Two recent articles on the Apple-
AT&T relationship focus on the unlocking of the iPhone in the context of accessing the
digital media stored on the device. See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Temptations of the
Walled Garden: Digital Rights Management and Mobile Phone Carriers, 6 J. ON Tt:LI:coMM. &
pion nett. L. 77 (2007) (examining cellular carriers' involvement in using digital rights
management to lock in consumers to ancillary products and services in ways that might
undermine the DMCA's policies); Patrick J. Cleary, Note, The Apple Cat and the Fanboy
Mouse: Unlocking the Apple iPhone, 9 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 295 (2008) (arguing that unlocking
the iPhone to access alternate wireless carriers does not violate the DMCA).
16 See infra notes 145-250 and accompanying text. Section 1 of the Sherman Act pro-
hibits lelvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). The U.S. Supreme Court has inter-
preted this statute to prohibit certain tying arrangements, which the Court has defined as
an agreement by a party to sell a product (the tying product) only on the condition that
the buyer also purchase a different (or tied) product, or at least agree not to purchase that
product from any other supplier. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504
U.S. 451,461 (1992); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States. 356 U.S. 1,5-6 (1958).
19 See infra notes 215-251 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 252-322 and accompanying text. There are two other areas of law not
addressed in this Note—contracts and consumer protectionthat could also provide legal
remedies to iPhone purchasers seeking to access alternate wireless carriers. See Granick,
supra note 5. A number of commentators, for example, have examined the extent to which
individuals can contract around the limitations defined by intellectual property law, an
issue particularly relevant in the digital age, when consumers purchase bundles of licenses
embodied in physical products, rather than more traditional, tuigible products. See gener-
ally Viva R. Moffat, Super-Copyright: Contracts. Preemption, and the Structure of Copyright Policy
Making, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 45 (2007) (arguing that copyright law should preempt ad-
hesion contracts in clicksvrap or browsewrap form when they impose non-negotiated re-
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRY PRACTICES AND THE IPHONE
A. The History and Structure of the Cell Phone Industry and the
Practice of Locking Cell Phones
To understand why cell phones are locked into certain wireless
networks, it is important to understand the basic technologies used in
cell phones. 21
 When a caller uses a cell phone to make a call, the phone
transmits a signal using radio frequency channels. 22
 The call is transmit-
ted to a cell tower, which receives the transmission from the phone and
then sends it to another cell phone or to a land line via a mobile tele-
phone switching office. 25 The Federal Communications Commission
(the "FCC") allocates certain radio frequencies to wireless service carri-
ers, which then allow consumers to access their networks using ap-
proved cell phones.24 Currently, there are two main mobile networks in
the United States, GSM and CDMA. 25
 T-Mobile and AT&T use the GSM
network; Sprint and Verizon Wireless use the CDMA network. 26
strictions on fair use); Kathleen K. Olson, Preserving the Copyright Balance: Statutory and Con-
stitutional Preemption of Contract-Based Claims, 11 COMM. L. & Y 83 (2006) (arguing that
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution should replace § 301 of the Copyright Act when
determining whether copyright law preempts contract law); Daniel E. Wanat, Copyright
Law, Contract Law, and Preemption Under 301(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976: A Study in Judi-
cial Labeling or Mislabeling and a Proposed Alternative, 31 VT, L. lbw. 707 (2007) (arguing that
courts should adopt a policy-based approach when examining whether copyright law pre-
empts private contracts).
Commentators have also examined whether consumer protection laws can prohibit
sellers from using abusive business practices that interfere with consumers' ability to make
use of the products they purchase. See generally David Bach, The Double Punch of Law and
Technology: Fighting Music Piracy or Remaking Copyright in a Digital Age, 6 Bus. & Pot- 1 (2004)
(arguing that the use of legal and electronic measures to protect digital content is not a
defense strategy against piracy, but rather an attempt to fundamentally alter the producer- .
consumer relationship, giving producers the upper hand); Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room
for Consumers Under the DACCA, 22 BERK F.I.EY L.J. 1119 (2007) (arguing that consumer
protection laws cannot fully address the threats to the interests of information consumers
because of the use of digital rights management, and that the interests of consumers
should be an integral part of copyright law analysis).
tt See Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 [wet. J. Comm. 389, 395 (2007) ("Why can't you
just buy a cell phone and use it on any network, like a normal phone").
22 Holman Complaint, supra note 12,'1 21, at 4.
25 Id.
24 Comments of Jonathan R. Newman, Vice President, The Wireless Alliance LLC &
Robert Pinkerton, to Library of Congress, Copyright Office, In re Exemption to Prohibition
on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, (2006),
available at h ttp:/ /www.copyrigh Lgov/1201/2006/cornmen ts/gran ick_wirelessall inn ce. pdf
[hereinafter Exemption Proposal].
25 See In re Wireless Tel. Servs. Antitrust Litig., 385 F. Stipp. 2d 403, 408 n.6 (S.D.N.Y
2005). There are two other mobile networks, TDMA, now obsolete, and iDen, used by
1042	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 49:1037
Historically, wireless carriers have conditioned access to their net-
works on the purchase of approved cellular phones, 27 The carriers have
justified this practice on two grounds. 28 First, providing an efficient and
secure wireless network requires handsets to meet certain standards
defined by the cellular service providers. 29 Second, the packaging of
cell phone service and handsets allows the carriers to subsidize the pro-
duction of handsets, making it more affordable for consumers to ob-
tain wireless service."'
As a result, consumers are not free to pick and choose the net-
works to which they connect once they have purchased a phone. 31 For
one thing, GSM-enabled phones are not compatible with CDMA-
enabled phones, so even if consumers could escape one cellular car-
rier, they would only be able to access another carrier on the same
network.32
 Furthermore, wireless carriers prevent users from switch-
ing carriers either through contractual obligations, software locks, or
both." The software locks prevent the user from accessing copy-
righted mobile firmware, which controls the "secret handshake" be-
tween the mobile handset and the wireless carrier. 34 Without access to
such firmware, the cell phone can only access the network authorized
by the cellular service provider."
The policy of locking consumers into cellular networks appears to
be changing." For example, in 2006, consumers filed a class action law-
suit against wireless carrier Sprint, accusing the company of anticom-
petitive practices relating to the software locks. 37 Sprint chose to settle
the case and provided consumers with the codes necessary to unlock
Nextel. See id. The Wireless Telephone Services Antitrust Litigation refers to these networks as
technologies; the Exemption Proposal refers to them as mobile networks. Id. at 408; Ex-
emption Proposal, supra note 24, at 3. This Note will use the term "mobile networks."
26 See Wireless Tel, Servs. Antitrust Litig., 385 F. Supp. 2d at 408.
27
 Exemption Proposal, supra note 24, at 4; Fred Vogelstein, Weapon of Mass Disruption,
WIRED, Feb. 2008, at 118, 122.
2s See Wireless Tel. Servs. Antitrust Litig., 385 F. Supp. 2d at 410; Robert W. Hahn et al.,
The Economics of -Wireless Net Neutrality", 3J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 399, 418-22 (2007).
" Hahn et al., supra note 28, at 418-22.
aa Wireless Tel. Servs. Antitrust Litig., 385 F. Stipp. 2d at 410.
31 Exemption Proposal, supra note 24, at 4.
32
 See id. at 3.
33 Id. at 4, 7.
34 Id. at 4.
35 See id.
" Sce Editorial, A Cellular Sea Change, N.Y. Tours, Dec. 1, 2007, at A14; Carolyn Y. John-
son, Big Wireless Carriers Get Set to Free the Phone, BOSTON GLom:, Mar. 28, 2008, at Al.
37 Johnson, supra note 36.
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their cell phones and gain access to other CDMA network carriers." T-
Mobile has a policy of unlocking any handset at a subscriber's request,
and Verizon announced at the end of 2007 that it would open its net-
work to any phone that meets a minimum technical standard and is
operable on the CDMA network." Even AT&T has announced that cus-
tomers can use any handset of their choosing on its network."
Apple and AT&T, however, have resisted this wave of change with
the 'Phone.'" Indeed, the "iPhone is anything but open."42 The 'Phone
only works on a single carrier, AT&T, which uses a Subscriber Identity
Module ("SIM") lock mechanism to prevent consumers from switching
networks by barring other networks from accessing the copyrighted
software inside the iPhone. 43 Under this system, a removable SIM card
is attached to the phone, which allows it to be instantly activated, inter-
changed and upgraded." The SIM card itself is tied to the AT&T net-
work, rather than the phone, which could potentially allow consumers
to swap cards to access networks without having to buy new phones. 45 In
fact, AT&T will unlock SIM cards on other telephones like the Black-
berry Pearl and the Samsung Blackjack." AT&T, however, will not
unlock the iPhone. 47
B. Introducing the iPhone: A Revolutionary Cell Phone for the Consumer and
a New Way of Conducting Business for the Cell Phone Industry
AT&T's refusal to unlock the iPhone SIM cards is consistent with
the overall business model pursued by Apple and AT&T in the devel-
opment and marketing of the iPhone, a model one commentator calls
a "walled garden" approach: attract consumers to the iPhone and then
lock them into Apple's and AT&T's networks." Earning the exclusive
"Id.
39 Wireless Tel. Servs. Antitrust Ling, 385 F. Stipp. 2d at 410; A Cellular Sea Change, supra
note 36.
49 Leslie Cauley, AT&T Flings Cellphone Network Wide Open, USA Toonv, Dec. 5, 2007,
h up:// www.usatoday.co tri/ tech /wireless/ pho nes/2007-12-05-att_N .h mt.
•	 41 Netanel, supra note 17, at 78-80; A Cellular Sea Change, supra note 36.
42 A Cellular Sea Change, supra note 36.
43 Holman Complaint. supra note 12,11 29-34, at 6-7; Exemption Proposal, supra note
24, at 7.
44 Holman Complaint, supra note 12,1 29, at 6; Exemption Proposal, supra note 24, at
7.
43 Holman Complaint, supra note 12,11 29-34, at 6-7; Exemption Proposal, supra note
24, at 7; Wu, supra note 21, at 400-01.
46 Holman Complaint, supra note 12,1 34, at 7; Cauley, supra note 40.
47 Holman Complaint, supra note 12,1 34, at 7.
98 See Netanel, supra note 17, at 78-80.
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right to provide cellular service to iPhone purchasers was AT&T's move
to steal customers away from competing service providers. 49 So far, the
strategy has worked. 5° Following the release of the iPhone, AT&T's
wireless revenue increased 14.4% to $10.9 billion in the third quarter of
2007, thanks in part to 1.1 million iPhone customers. 51 Forty percent of
these new customers switched to AT&T from competitors. 52
The iPhone business deal with AT&T is just as lucrative for Ap-
ple. 53 In exchange for the exclusive right to provide cellular service to
iPhone users for five years, AT&T shares its revenue on all iPhone con-
tracts with Apple.54 Although the companies have not released the ex-
act terms of this revenue sharing agreement, one business analyst esti-
mates that Apple receives as much as $18 per month for each iPhone
subscriber. 55 Apple, therefore, receives $432 per iPhone subscriber over
the course of a two-year con tract. 56
The most remarkable aspect of the Apple-AT&T relationship is
the unprecedented power that AT&T gave Apple in the design, manu-
facture and marketing of the iPhone. 57 Historically, wireless carriers
have wielded the power in cell phone development. 58 The iPhone
made Apple the first company to develop a cell phone without any
input from a cellular carrier. 59
A unique product resulted from this unique business relation-
ship, one that stands out among other "smart phones," a generic term
used to refer to cell phones that can perform "smart" data services
49 Laurie J. Flynn, AT&T Profit Surges 41%, with Help from iPhone, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
2007, at C4; Reinhardt Krause, Wireless Leads as AT&T's Q3 Shows Growth, INV. Bus. DAIIX,
Oct. 24, 2007 [hereinafter Krause, AT&T Growth].
"Krause, AT&T Growth, supra note 49.
51 Id,
52 Id,
55
 Tom Krazit, PiperJaffray: AT&T Paying Apple $18 per iPhorte, per Month, CNET, Oct. 24,
2007, http://www.news.conh/8301-13579_3-9803657-37.html; Vogelstein, supra note 27, at
122 (estimating that Apple nets $80 for every $399 iPhone it sells, in addition to $240 for
every two-year AT&T contract that an iPhone customer sights).
54
 Hahn et al., supra note 28, at 430; Krazit, supra note 53; Vogelstein, supra note 27, at
122.
55 Krazit, supra note 53.
56 Id.
57
 Walter S. Mossberg, Free My Phone, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2007, at RI [hereinafter
Mossberg, Free]; Vogelstein, supra note 27, at 122.
58 Wireless Tel. Servs. Antitrust Litig., 385 F. Supp. 2d at 409-10; Mossberg, Free, supra
note 57; Vogelstein, supra note 27, at 123.
Mossberg, Free, supra note 57; Vogelstein, supra note 27, at 122-23.
2008]	 Unlocking the iPhone: Antitrust & the Inadequacies of Copyright 	 1045
like access email, send text messages, or manipulate spreadsheets. 6°
The iPhone grants consumers unparalleled access to the Internet
through a wireless device that also acts as a portable media player.61
Like Apple's iPod, the iPhone allows users to download and listen to
music and movies purchased from iTunes. 62 In fact, it is one of only
two cell phones that have this capability. 63 Moreover, the iPhone is a
visually attractive product, boasting what one Wall Street Partial author
calls "the largest and most beautiful screen I've ever seen on a cell
phone."64 These features led Time magazine to anoint the iPhone as
its Invention of the Year. 65
Many consumers have overlooked the iPhone's imperfections
because of these innovative features. 66
 These imperfections include its
inability to perform email searches, record video, or run certain pro-
grams over the Internet.67
 Despite its initial price tag of $599, Apple
sold 1.4 million iPhones in the device's first three months on the
market (outselling all other smart phones), and Apple is forecast to
sell 12 million units by the end of 2008. 68 The iPhone has thus al-
lowed Apple to rapidly catch up with competitors in the smart phone
6°
 Lev Grossman, Invention of the Year: The iPhone, Torte, Nov. 12, 2007, at 60; Walter S.
Mossberg, Blackjack Beats Out Palm 750, but iPhone May Well Top Both, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11,
2007, at 131 [hereinafter Mossberg, Blackjack]; Keith Reed, How Smart Is Your Cellphone?,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 5, 2005, at Dl (defining 'smart phone"); Vogelstein, supra note 27, at
122, 125.
61 Jefferson Graham, iPhone Mania Nears Fever Pitch, USA Tonav, June 20, 2007, at 1B
(hereinafter Graham, iPhone Mania].
62 See Netanel, supra note 17, at 79-80.
63 Sec Smith Complaint, supra note 12, 1 34 at 7 (silting that the iPhone is the only cell
phone that can play media from iTunes Music Store). But see MOTOROKR, hup://direct.
motorola.com/hellomoto/rokr/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2008) (other cell phone capable of
playing music off of iTunes).
" Mossberg, Blackjack, supra note 60. Time declared that the iPhone was 2007's best in-
vention in part because the iPhone was "pretty." Grossman, supra note 60, at 60.
fa Grossman, supra note 60, at 60.
66 Vogelstein, supra note 27, at 125.
67 Grossman, supm note 60, at 60; Vogelstein, supra note 27, at 125.
66 Brian Garrity, New iPod Keeps Apple Shams Crisp, N.Y. l'os't, Sept. 5, 2007, at 33: Jeffer-
son Graham, iPhorre's Future Intrigues Observers, USA Tothw, Jan. 3, 2008, at 8A [hereinafter
Graham, iPhone's Future]; Katie Hafner & Brad Stone, iPhone Owners Crying Foul over Price
Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at Cl (documenting Apple's $200 price cut on the iPhone).
Other smart phones include the Nokia N95 ($700), Nokia N810 ($480), Palm Centro
($99), Sprint HTC Touch ($250 after $100 mail-in rebate), T-Mobile Shadow ($150 after a
$150 instant discount and $50 mail-in rebate), T-Mobile Sidekick LX ($300), and Verizon
Wireless LG Voyager (NA). See Ryan Kim, Competitors Wrestling with iPhone, S.F. CIIRON„
Nov. 5, 2007, at El.
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market. 69
 By the end of the third quarter of 2007, the iPhone owned
27% of the smart phone market." One research firm has claimed that
the pace of adoption for the iPhone was "likely ... unprecedented in
the history of the mobile-handset market."71
Although consumers and commentators rave about the iPhone,
they have been less enthused about the quality of AT&T's service.72 As
one business analyst remarked: "'The customer experience hasn't
been that good,' .... Users are facing dropped calls, poor sound
quality and slow Internet access."73 Consumers have also voiced their
displeasure on the flog, i hate my iPhone. 74 One user from Los Angeles
wrote: "[A] t least 7 dropped calls a day every day. [S] ignal never clear.
muffled or echo most of the time ... [AT&T] is just the worst. and
[S]teve Mobs has lost my respect for doing the deal with them."76
Another consumer was less specific with his criticism, writing, "I
HATE AT[&]T. THESE PEOPLE ARE LOOSERS [sic]." 76 Others can-
not experience the extent of AT&T's poor service because they live in
areas where AT&T provides no service. 77 One Wisconsin consumer
expressed her disappointment with her inability to access the AT&T
w Paul Vaughn. It's Been a Banner Year for Apple, Inc., SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, Dec. 30,
2007, at 02K.
70 Id.
71 Garrity, supra note 68.
72 See Grossman, supra note 60, at 60; Quinn, supra note 4; Shaheen Samavati, Cell Users
Send Clear Signal: Service Is Less Than Ideal, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 4, 2007, at Al;
Silverman, supra note 4. Consumers have criticized AT&T even though the company at-
tempted to improve its service specifically for the arrival of the iPhone. Sec Iljitsch van Bei-
jnum, AT&T Getting Its Network Ready for the iPhone, ARS TECIINICA, June 5, 2007,
http://arstechn ica.co ni/journals/apple.ars/ 2007/ 06/05/att-ge tting-its-n etwork-ready-for-
the-iplion e (explaining that AT&T retuned its cell towers to provide optimum coverage in
areas where the iPhone is likely to be used); Vogelstein, supra note 27, at 122 (explaining
that AT&T developed a new visual voice mail feature for the &hone). Interestingly, the
new visual voice mail feature developed by AT&T for the iPhone has been the subject of a
patent infringement lawsuit. Rex Crum, Lawsuit Cites Old Device in Complaint over iPhone,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 4, 2007, at C.5.
72 Patrick Seitz, In Eyeing Phone Battle, CEO Jobs Blinks, Irrv, Bus. DAILY, Sept. 6, 2007, at
A4.
74 I Hate my iPhone, http://wwwihatemyiphone.com  (last visited Feb. 25, 2008).
75 Posting of filminaker257 to I Hate My iPhone, http://www.ihatemyiplione.com/
hate_64/ (2007).
76 Posting of TEX to I Hate My iPhone, http://www.ihatetnyiphone.com/hate_69/
(2007).
77 Sec Robert Imrie, iPhone Service Gaps Are Big Letdown: New Device Uses Limited AT&T
Network, Si. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), June 30, 2007, at El (explaining that there is
limited service in parts of Wisconsin, Vermont, the Dakotas, and Alaska); Silverman, supra
note 4 (noting that one consumer purchased an iPhone even though AT&T offers no wire-
less service in his home state of Vermont).
20081	 Unlocking the iPhone: Antitrust E...e the Inadequacies of Copyright 	 1047
network, saying, "I do want an iPhone].... I have nearly every other
Apple product that I can get my hands on. [II Phone is just all of them
put together. Being in Wausau, it is just not possible. All my friends
are quite disappointed."" A Consumer Reports survey taken at the
end of 2007 affirms these complaints: AT&T's cellular service ranks
second-to-last in customer satisfaction."
IL THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT AND THE
CELL PHONE EXEMPTION
Although Apple may have revolutionized the cell phone industry
with the iPhone, its method of locking consumers into the AT&T net-
work through technological means is relatively comnion in the digital
age.8° Problems arise when consumers bypass the technological pro-
tection mechanisms and software locks meant to prevent certain
uses. 81 The next section addresses Congress' response to this circum-
vention problem through the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (the
"DMCA" or the "Act"). 82
A. The DMCA's Anti-Circumvention Provisions
Under Section 106 of the Copyright Act, owners of copyrights
have the exclusive right and authority to reproduce and distribute
copies of their copyrighted works. 83
 In the digital world, the same
technological innovations that allow businesses to offer their copy-
righted materials online also allow individuals to pirate those materi-
78 Imrie, supra note 77.
Samavati, supra note 72.
ee See Netanel, supra note 17, at 77-78; Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 12, at 332-35; Mau-
ricio Espana, Note, The Fallacy That Fair Use and Information Should Be Provided for Free: Au
Analysis of the Responses to the MCA's Section 1201, 31 FORMIAM URB, U. 135, 148-54
(2003) (summarizing the various technological protection measures available to copyright
holders of digital works). Copyright holders use digital rights management to prevent con-
sumers from illegally copying CDs and DVDs. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273
F.3d 429.436-37 (2d Cir. 2001); Fran Kahana, Sony's DAV Experience: 44lhett Copyright Protec-
tion Attacks, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 627,627-28 (2006). TicketMaster. an online re-
tailer of entertainment and sports tickets, uses a computer security program to prevent
purchasers from using automated devices to purchase tickets. Ticketmaster, L.L.C. v. RMG
Techs., Inc., 507 F. Stipp. 2d 1096, 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2007). In effect, as firms have explored
the new business opportunities offered by the Internet and the digital revolution, they
have also explored new ways of controlling how consumers interact with their products. See
id.; Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 12, at 332-35.
81 Espana, supra note 80, at 144-46.
e2 See infra notes 83-143 and accompanying text.
89 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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als. 84 With the click of a mouse, infringers can copy and disseminate
songs, movies, books, and other copyrighted works across the world. 85
The music industry, for example, estimates that 243 million
downloads of copyrighted files occur every month through the use of
peer-to-peer networks. 86
In response to piracy threats, content providers have largely re-
sorted to self-help measures to protect their copyrighted works. 87 Us-
ing encryption technologies and digital rights management, content
providers have attempted to exercise greater control over how con-
sumers access and use copyrighted materials. 88 In response, a number
of tech-savvy individuals have circumvented the technological protec-
tion measures, thus revealing a major gap in copyright law. 89 If con-
tent providers have no way of controlling the access and use of their
copyrighted materials, they will stop making their works available in
digital formats."
To address this problem, Congress passed the DMCA. 91 The
DMCA imposes legal sanctions on both the act of circumvention of en-
cryption measures and the distribution of products and services that
help others circumvent encrwtion. 92 Section 1201(a) of the Act ad-
dresses the circumvention of access controls, which are technological
measures designed to restrict access to a copyrighted work. 95 Section
SI Espana, supra note 80, at 136,144-46.
85 See id.
86 Music United, hop://musicunited.org (last visited Oct.. 5, 2007).
87 See Netanel, supra note 17, at 77-78; Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 12, at 332-35;
Espana, supra note 80, at 148-54.
8S See Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 436-37,440.
89 See Espana, supra note 80, at 153-54.
9° See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 8,11 (1998).
91 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304,112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see also Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's
Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. RI:v. 397,428 (2003) (describing the rationale underlying
the DMCA). This Note will focus on the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA. 17
U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
92 S. REP. No. 105.190, at 11 (analogizing the provisions "to making it illegal to break
into a house using a tool, the primary purpose of which is to break into houses"); Dan L.
Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology, 74 FORDHANI L.
REV. 537,557-61 (2005) (providing an overview of the DMCA's legislative history, as well
as its use as a deterrent against the circumvention of technological protection measures)
[hereinafter Burk, Legal and Technical). One commentator refers to the DMCA in the con-
text of digital rights management as "the double punch of law and technology." Bach,
supra note 20, at 1.
93 See 17 U.S.C. 1201(a); Burk, Legal and Technical, supra note 92, at 558-59 (criticiz-
ing the DMCA for creating a new and unprecedented right to control access to copy-
righted works); Lance C. McCardle, Note, Despite Congress's Good Intentions, The DMCA's
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1201(b) addresses the circumvention of rights controls, which are•
technological measures designed to prohibit the copying or distribut-
ing of a copyrighted work." Under both sections, it is unlawful to traffic
in devices or technologies primarily designed or produced for the pur-
pose of circumventing technological protection measures." The two
sections are distinguishable in that § 1201(a) (1) prohibits the actual act
of circumventing an access contro1. 96 There is no corresponding prohi-
bition on the act of circumventing a rights control mechanist -n.97
11. Wireless Connection Exemption
In crafting the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA, Con-
gress was careful not to tip the copyright balance too far in favor of
copyright owners at the expense of the general public.98
 For example,
pursuant to her rulemaking authority under § 1201(a) (1) (C), the Li-
brarian of Congress granted a wireless connection exemption that al-
lows individuals to circumvent the technological protection measures
that control access to "the firmware that enable wireless telephone
handsets to connect to a wireless telephone communications network,
when circumvention' is accomplished for the sole purpose of lawfully
connecting to a wireless telephone communication network." 99 In
Anti-Circumvention Provisions Produce a Bad Result—A Means to Create Monopolies, 50 Loy. L.
REV. 997, 1005-06 (2004) (noting that the anti-access provision of the DMCA makes it
illegal to circumvent a technological measure protecting a copyrighted work, regardless of
whether that circumvention results in copyright infringement).
94 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b).
96 See id. § 1201 ( a)-( b) .
96
 See id.
97 See id.
96 See Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1192-96 (Fed. Cir.
2004). For example, Congress included a saving clause to assure that the anticircumven-
tion provisions are not used to obstruct other rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (1). Section
1201 (c) (1) states, "Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or de-
fenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title." Id. Similarly,
§ 1201(c) (4) mandates that "tn]othing in this section shall enlarge or diminish any rights
of free speech or the press for activities using consumer electronics, telecommunications,
or computing products." Id. § 1201(c) (4). In addition, Congress exempted certain circum-
venting activities, including reverse engineering. Id. § 1201(f). For more on how Con-
gress's balancing with the DMCA fits within the much larger, ongoing debate between
rights holders and consumers, see Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention,
84 DENY. U. L. REV. 13, 16-32 (2006).
99 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472, 68,476 (proposed Nov. 27, 2006) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) [hereinafter Librarian Rulemaking]. Every three years the
MICA requires the Librarian to identify certain classes of copyrighted works to which the
anticircumvention provision will not apply because users will be "adversely affected by the
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other words, circumventing or removing cell phone locks in order to
lawfully access a competing network does not constitute copyright in-
fringement.wo Although opponents of the exemption argued that it
might allow users to gain unauthorized access to copyrighted works
downloaded onto cell phones, the exemption was carefully written, al-
lowing circumvention for the sole purpose of lawfully connecting to a
competitor's network.m The Librarian, upon the recommendation of
the Register of Copyrights, concluded that the software locks are access
controls that adVersely affect the ability of consumers to make nonin-
fringing use of the software on their phones.'° 2
In proposing the exemption, the Wireless Alliance, a firm that
recycles and resells used, refurbished, and new cellular products, ar-
gued that cell phone locking hurts competition and innovation. 103 By
making it difficult for consumers to switch wireless carriers, carriers
have less incentive to improve their networks because there is little
fear that consumers will switch to a competitor)"
prohibition ... in their ability to make noninfringing uses under this title of a particular
class of copyrighted works." 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (C). For more on the Librarian Rule-
making, see generally Aaron Perzanowski, Evolving Standards & the Future of DMCA Antieir-
cumvention Rulernaking, 101 INTERNET L. 1 (2007).
ici° Librarian Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,476-77; Perzanowski, supra note 99, at 16.
1 ° 1 See Librarian Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,476.
"2 See id. at 68,476-77.
100
 Exemption Proposal, supra note 24, at 4-5. One scholar also explained how cell
phone locking could harm competition and innovation, drawing insight from the FCC's
Carterfone rules of the 1960s and 1970s (which gave consumers the right to attach whatever
devices they wanted to their phone lines) and the tremendous innovation and competition
that those rules created in the telecommunications industry. See Wu, supra note 21, at 395-
98.
Other commentators criticized the DMCA for its negative impact on competition. See
Dan L. Burk, Araticircurnvention Misuse 50 UCLA L. Rini. 1095, 1096-97 (2003) [hereinafter
Burk, Anticircumvention]; Burk, Legal and Technical, supra note 92, at 561-68; McCardle,
supra note 93, at 997-99; Nit, supra note 98, at 38. Another commentator argued that the
DMCA will not generate anticompetitive effects even if manufacturers see it as a way of
precluding competition in aftermarkets as long as courts carefully interpret the statute's
language and its legislative history. Sec Daniel C. Higgs, Lexmark International, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc. & Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs, Inc.: The
DMCA and Durable Goods Afterniarkets, 19 BERKELEY TEO!. L.J. 59, 77-83 (2004).
104 Exemption Proposal, supra note 24, at 4-5. The Wireless Alliance made several
other arguments in favor of the exemption as well, Id. at 4-6. For one, it argued that lock-
ing hurts the environment. Id. at 5-6. Once a service contract is complete, consumers have
no use for a cell phone that they cannot unlock and use with a new service provider. Id.
Consequently, Americans discard 150 million mobile phones per year, a troubling statistic
given that the phones are incinerated, releasing toxic chemicals into the environment. Id.
In addition, the Wireless Alliance argued that locking contributes to the "digital divide." a
phrase used to capture the disparity between rich and poor countries' access to new tech-
nological innovations. Id. Unlocking would give poorer nations access to second-hand cell
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Reiterating the Wireless Alliance's arguments, the recommenda-
tion of the Register of Copyrights also emphasized the overwhelming
support for the proposal, noting only one comment opposing the ex-
emption) 05
 The Register of Copyrights also defended the exemption
on the ground that it would not undermine the purposes of the
DMCA's anticircumvention provision. 106 In fact, the Register of Copy-
rights recognized that the access controls were not used to protect the
value or integrity of copyrighted works, but rather to limit the ability
of subscribers to switch to other carriers, a business decision that has
little to do with copyright law. 107
 Finally, the Register of Copyrights
argued that a strict interpretation of § 1201 would likely condemn the
circumvention of a cell phone's software lock, even if only to connect
to a new network)" With these policy considerations in mind, the
Register recommended the wireless connection exemption to avoid
such a dangerous interpretation of the DMCA. 109
To date, only one court has applied the exemption. 11 ° In 2007,
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida in TracFone
Wiretas v. Dixon found that the defendants' conduct did not come
within the scope of the exemption. 11 ' In that case, the defendants
purchased the plaintiff's prepaid wireless telephones in bulk, circum-
vented the software locks that enabled the phones to work exclusively
on the plaintiff's wireless system, and sold the unlocked phones at a
premium to the public. 112
 The court refused to apply the exemption
because the defendants resold the handsets for a profit and therefore
did not unlock them for the sole purpose of lawfully connecting to a
wireless telephone communication network)'
phones, thereby allowing all consumers to share in the information revolution. Id. In fact,
an extra ten phones per 100 people in a typical developing country increases Gross Do-
mestic Product by 0.6 percentage points. Id.
105 Letter from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to James H. Bill ington, Librar-
ian of Congress (Nov. 17, 2006), at 42, available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/
1201 _recommendation.pdf {hereinafter Copyright Register Reconunendation].
106 Id. at 48-52.
107
	 at 52; see Perzanowski, supra note 99, at 16.
108 Copyright Register Recommendation, supra note 105, at 51.
109 Id. at 52-53.
n° TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Dixon, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
111 Id.
112 See id. at 1237.
112 See id. at 1238.
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C. Courts Interpret the Anti-Circumvention Provisions of the DMCA
The TracFone case illustrates a recurring problem facing courts
charged with interpreting the DMCA's anticircumvention provisions.'"
Congress passed the DMCA to give content providers a legal weapon to
attack the piracy of copyrighted works, but cases invoking the law have
often dealt with obscure software embedded in products." 5 Individuals
circumvent access controls guarding this software not to pirate the
copyrighted work, but to allow the product to perform some other
function against the producer's wishes. 116
In 2004, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit held in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.
that the defendant did not violate the DMCA's anticircumvention
provision.n 7 There, the plaintiff, a computer printer manufacturer,
sold toner cartridges for its printers that only it could refill because
the cartridges contained a microchip designed to prevent the printers
from working with a competitor's toner cartridges." 8 The defendant,
in an effort to support the market for competing toner cartridges,
mimicked the plaintiff's microchip to allow third-party cartridges to
work with the plaintiff's printers."9 The plaintiff sued under
§ 1201(a) (2) of the DMCA, claiming that the defendant circumvented
the plaintiff's technological measure (the microchip), which effec-
tively controlled access to its copyrighted works—the Toner Loading
Program and Printer Engine Program—two pieces of software em-
bedded in the plaintiffs printers.'"
In holding that the defendant did not violate the DMCA, the court
first held that the Toner Loading Program was not copyrightable;
therefore, the defendant did not circumvent any technological meas-
ure controlling access to a copyrighted work. 121 Second, the court held
that it was the purchase of the plaintiff's printer that controlled access
to the copyrighted Printer Engine Program, not the microchip. 122 Any_
114
 See id.
115 See Lexmark Intl, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522,529-33
(6th Cir. 2004); Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1183-85; S. REP. No. 105-190, at 11; Ili, supra note
98, at 38.
116 See Lexmark 387 F.3d at 551-52 (Merritt, J., concurring); Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at
1199-1203.
'LT Lexrnark, 387 F.3d at 546.
118 Id. at 528-30.
119
 Id. at 529.
126 Id. at 529,546.
121 Id. at 550; McCardle, supra note 93, at 1015-16.
Lexmade, 387 F.3d at 549-50; McCardle, supra note 93, at 1016.
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one who bought a printer from the plaintiff could easily read the literal
code of the Printer Engine Program directly from the printer memory
without having to circumvent the microchip. 123
 Hence, the court held,
the microchip that the defendant circumvented did not effectively control
access to the plaintiff's copyrighted work. 124
In a concurring opinion, Judge Merritt emphasized that the de-
fendant's purpose, though commercial in nature, was only to sell car-
tridges that could be used by the plaintiff's printers, rather than to
profit by infringing the plaintiff's copyright, 125
 Consequently, even if
the plaintiffs Toner Loading Program were copyrightable, or if con-
sumers had no way of accessing the Printer Engine Program, Judge
Merritt opined that the defendant would still not have violated the
Act. 126 The defendant circumvented the plaintiffs microchip not to
"reap any benefit" from the copyrighted works, but only to stimulate
competition in the cartridge market. 127
 Judge Merritt feared that
holding for the plaintiff or even narrowly construing the majority
opinion could allow companies to use the DMCA in the future to cre-
ate monopolies in the market for replacement parts. 128
In the same year as Lexmark, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in Chamberlain. Group, Inc. u Skylink Technologies, Inc.
faced a similar issue in the context of garage door openers. 129
 Garage
door openers usually consist of two devices: a handheld portable
transmitter and an opening device mounted to the homeowner's ga-
rage.'" To open the door, the user activates the transmitter, which
sends a signal to the opening device.m A software program in the
opening device then triggers the opening of the door. 132 Although
garage door opener manufactures sell their opening devices and
125 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 546.
124 Id. at 549-50.
125 Id. at 551-52 (Merritt, J., concurring).
125 See id.
127 Id.; Burk, Anticircumvention, supra note 103, at 1110 ("[T]his claim has nothing to
do with the pirating of music or other copyrighted content; rather, it is a fairly naked at-
tempt to suppress competition in the market for printer ink cartridges.").
125 See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 551-52 (Merritt, J., concurring). In line with Judge Mer-
ritt's reasoning, one commentator argued that Congress should rewrite the DMCA so that
courts do not have to "search for creative reasons to refrain from applying the DMCA in
Lexmark-like situations," fearing that companies will just tweak the facts of the Lexmark case
to fit under the DMCA. Sec id.; McCardle, supra note 93, at 1017-18.
129 See Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1183-85.
1517 Id. at 1183.
Id.
132 Id.
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transmitters in one package, customers have the option of purchasing
replacement or spare transmitters in the aftermarket. 133 The plaintiff
in this case manufactured and sold its garage door openers equipped
with a security measure embedded in the transmitter)" The defen-
dant manufactured a transmitter that allowed users to bypass the
plaintiff's security measure to operate the plaintiff's opening de-
vice. 133 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant violated § 1201(a) (2)
by trafficking in a transmitter that circumvented the plaintiffs secu-
rity measure designed to prevent access to copyrighted software em-
bedded in the plaintiff's opening device. 136
As in Lexmath, the court rejected the plaintiffs § 1201(a) (2)
claim. 137 When consumers purchased the plaintiffs garage door opener,
the court said, they were granted authority to access the copyrighted
software, thus allowing them to use third-party transmitters to operate
the opening device."8 Given this implicit authorization, the court re-
fused to hold the defendants liable for trafficking in a device (the
transmitter) primarily designed for the purpose of circumventing a
technological protection measure (the plaintiffs security measure) ef-
fectively controlling access to a copyrighted work (the software in the
plaintiff s opening device) . 139
In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the plaintiff's
claim that the DMCA empowered manufacturers to prohibit consum-
ers from using embedded software products in conjunction with
competing products)" This type of empowerment would conflict with
the copyright owner's other legal responsibilities, particularly those
imposed by antitrust laws."' The plaintiffs construction of the DMCA
would allow manufacturers to leverage sales in a primary market into
monopolies in an aftermarket, a practice that violates antitrust laws
and the doctrine of copyright mistise. 342
I 22 Id.
1'4 Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1183-85.
195
	 at 1183.
136 See 17 U.S.C.§ 1201 (a) (2); Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1185.
122 See Lexmai-k, 387 F.3d at 549-50; Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1202.
138 Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1204; Burk, Legal and Technical, supra note 92, at 566,568
(explaining that the implicit license to use the garage door opener with competing prod-
ucts could easily have been revoked by a shrink-wrap contract giving the plaintiff a cause of
action under the DMCA).
199
 See Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1203-09.
140 See id. at 1193,1201-02.
141 Ed. at 1194,1201-02.
142 Id. at 1201. The majority in Chamberlain, like Judge Merritt in his Lamar* concur-
rence, did not want to allow any manufacturer of any product to add a single copyrighted
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Both Lexmark and Chamberlain reveal the thin line between intel-
lectual property and antitrust law and show that copyright holders can
exploit the DMCA to restrict competition unlawfully. 143
 The next part
explores the antitrust issues in more depth, paying specific attention
to tying arrangements. 144
111. TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND SECTION 1 OF THE
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT
A tying arrangement is an agreement by a party to sell a product
(the tying product) only on the condition that buyers also purchase a
different product (the tied product), or at least agree that they will
not purchase the tied product from any other supplier. 146 Tying the
sale of two products that could be sold separately is a common prac-
tice in the marketplace: left shoes are sold with right shoes, and the
sports section of a newspaper is sold in a bundled package with the
business section. 146 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has been careful
not to declare all tying arrangements unlawful, but only those that
restrain competition, such arrangements being prohibited by Section
1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 147
A tying arrangement is illegal when the seller exploits his or her
control over the tying product to force the buyer to purchase the tied
sentence or software fragment to its product, wrap the copyrighted material in a trivial
'encryption' scheme, and thereby gain the right to restrict consumers' rights to use its
products in conjunction with competing products." See id.; see also Lexmark, 387 F.3d 551-52
(Merritt, J., concurring). This type of behavior gives producers the ability to gain monopo-
lies in aftermarkets by precluding others from competing. McCardle, supra note 93, at
1019.
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Lexmark, 387 F.3d 551-52 (Merritt, J., concurring); Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at
1201.
144 See infra notes 145-213 and accompanying text. ,
145 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992); N.
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
146 David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence front Com-
petitive Markets and Implications for 7 . iirg Law, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 37, 37 (2005); Alan J.
Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA.
L. REV. I, 1-2 (1997).
147 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462: Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11 -12 (1984). Ties have also been challenged as improper
extensions of the patent monopoly under the patent misuse doctrine, as unfair methods of
competition under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and as contracts tending to
create a monopoly under § 3 of the Clayton Act. See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. hidep. Ink, Inc.,
547 U.S. 28, 34 (2006). Because the substantive law governing tying arrangements is
analogous across the various statutes, this Note will focus on § 1 of the Sherman Act, which
has the broadest reach. See Fortner Enters. Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fortner!), 394 U.S. 495,
521 (Fortis, J., dissenting) (1969).
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product that the buyer either did not want or would have preferred to
purchase from another seller on different terms. 148 This kind of tying
arrangement undermines one of the tenets of a free economy, namely
that goods must withstand the "cold test of competition" and that the
consuming public must be able to choose a product or service on its
merits. 149 Unrestrained competition is important because it yields the
best allocation of economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality goods, and the greatest material progress, while still preserving
democratic, political, and social institutions.' 50 When a tying ar-
rangement forces the consumer to buy one product with another, the
seller insulates the tied good from competitive pressures, to the det-
riment of both consumers and producers.'m
On the consumer side, an illegal tie forces consumers to make
choices they would not make in a competitive market. 152 Specifically, the
need to purchase the tying product impairs the freedom of consumers
to select the best bargain in the market for the tied good. 198 Tying ar-
rangements also harm consumers when sellers exploit information de-
fects by complicating purchase decisions. 154 Instead of allowing con-
"8 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12.
See id. at 14; Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594,605 (1953).
Is° N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 4; Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency,
Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020,1023 (1987) ("In brief-
est compass, the economic goal of antitrust policy is to increase the material welfare of
society through the instrument of interfirrn rivalry.").
151 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14.
152 Id. at 15; Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 512 (White, J., dissenting).
In Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15; Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 512 (White, J., dissenting) ("This
distortion injures the buyers of the second product, who because of their preference for
the seller's brand of the first are artificially forced to make a less than optimal choice in
the second."); Meese, supra note 146, at 16.
154 See Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 512 (White, J., dissenting); Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust Tic-
In A nalysis  After Kodak: Understanding the Role of Market Imperfections, 62 ANTITRUST U. 263,
266-67 (1994) (arguing that the real policy interest in condemning tying arrangements is
to curb the ability of a producer to exploit informational asymmetries in order to get the
purchaser to make a decision he would not make in a freely competitive market); cf. East-
man Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473-74 (finding that Kodak had engaged in an illegal tying ar-
rangement by taking advantage of the high information and switching costs incurred by
consumers).
It is ambiguous, however, whether this holding applies to a situation where the con-
sumer is fully aware of the producer's tying arrangement in the aftermarkets at the time of
purchase in the primary market. Compare PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104
F.3d 811,820 (6th Ci•. 1997) (holding that the change in policy was crucial to the decision
in Eastman Kodak and that, by changing its policy after its customers were locked in," Ko-
dak took advantage of the fact that its customers lacked the information to anticipate the
change), with Grimes, supra at 273-74 (explaining that high information costs allow sellers
to exploit consumers through tying arrangements, regardless of whether there is a change
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sumers to assess the quality of products separately, thus enabling them
to make better decisions, ties force consumers to make a decision on
two products simultaneously. 155 This becomes a problem when the con-
sumer knows less about the tied product, or must incur great costs to
learn more. 156 In that situation, the lure of the tying product causes the
consumer to make a less than optimal decision on the tied product. 157
Finally, tying arrangements harm consumers by allowing producers to
extract a premium from buyers by forcing them to pay a higher price for
the tied product than they would in a competitive market.'"
in policy). One explanation for the difference between the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of
Eastman Kodak and Grimes' interpretation is that the Sixth Circuit addressed information
costs in the context of market power, concluding that market imperfections arising out of
information costs alone cannot prove market power in the tying product. See PSI Repair
Servs., Inc., 104 F.3d at 820. In contrast, Grimes addressed information costs in the context
of the anticompetitive effects of tying arrangements, arguing that complicated tying ar-
rangements can reduce the quality of consumer demand by taking advantage of a less-
informed choice. See Grimes, supra at 274. Therefore, the two contrasting views can be
reconciled by concluding that market failures relating to information are not enough to
prove market power in the tying product, but could be used to show the anticompetitive
effects of a tying arrangement if the consumer proved market power in another way. See
PSI Repair Servs., Inc., 104 F.3d at 820-21; Grimes, supra at 274.
155 Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 512 (White, J., dissenting); Grimes, supra note 154, at 267.
156 Grimes, supra note 154, at 274.276-77.
157 See Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 512 (White,J., dissenting).
156 See Meese, supra note 146, at 22-33 (analyzing the Chicago School's economic justi-
fications for tying arrangements against the Traditional School's criticism of tying ar-
rangements). The Chicago School's approach, articulated by Justice O'Connor in Jefferson
Parish, argues that most tying arrangements are not anticompetitive because the existence
of a tied product normally does not increase the profit that the seller with market power
can extract from sales of the tying product. 466 U.S. at 35-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The Chicago School analogizes the tie to a price increase in the tying product; therefore,
the profits a producer receives from the sale of the tied product are washed out by the
revenue the producer loses from the lower demand on the tying product. See Meese, supra
note 146, at 23-24. The Traditional Approach, on the other hand, views the transfer of
wealth from consumers to producers as the true harm of tying arrangements, regardless of
whether producers are extracting additional revenues from consumers above and beyond
what they would have extracted if they sold the tied products separately. See Bradley, supra
note 150, at 1032-35; Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern
of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 93-96 (1982);
Meese, supra note 146, at 29. Although this Note does not attempt to evaluate the eco-
nomic consequences of tying arrangements, it is important to recognize that the Sherman
Act was designed to prevent contracts or combinations that redistribute income front con-
sumers to producers in an effort to promote economic as well non-economic values like
social and political autonomy. See Londe, supra at 93-96; Meese, supra note 146, at 29-32.
Even Justice O'Connor concedes that tying arrangements can be economically harmful
when power in the market for the tying product is used to create additional market power
in the market for the tied product. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 36 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
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Tying arrangements can also have negative consequences on the
producer side, particularly in the market for the tied good. 159 By forc-
ing consumers to make less than optimal purchase decisions on the
tied product, tying arrangements can potentially insulate inferior tied
products from competitive pressures) 6° This hurts other producers of
the tied good when the tying arrangement forecloses a group of con-
sumers from the tied market that would otherwise be available to the
competing producers. 161 Furthermore, tying arrangements erect bar-
riers to entry in the tied market, 162 In order to sell a competing prod-
uct to certain buyers, a new company must not only produce the tied
product, but it also must overcome consumers' preferences for the
tying product. 163
Drawing the line between acceptable tying arrangements and
those violating antitrust laws has been a challenging task for the judi-
159 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14-15; Fortner /, 394 U.S. at 512-13 (White, J., dissent-
ing); Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 605-06.
160 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14; Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 605.
161 See Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 508; Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 605; Evans & Salinger, supra
note 146, at 50-51; Christopher R. Leslie, Cutting Through Tying Theory with Ocean's Razor:
A Simple Explanation of 7)ing Arrangements, 78 Tut- L. REV. 727,732-33 (2004); Michael D.
Whinston, iNng, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 Am. ECON. REV. 837,837 (1990). This argu-
ment is also known as the leverage theory because the tying arrangement provides a
mechanism whereby a firm can leverage its market power over the tying product to fore-
close sales in, and thereby monopolize, the tied market. Leslie, supra at 732-736; Whin-
ston, supra at 837. The Chicago School has challenged the leverage theory, arguing that a
monopolist has neither the incentive, nor the ability to leverage monopoly into another
market. Evans & Salinger, supra note 146, at 39-40. One economist, however, has shown
that firms can use tying arrangements strategically to foreclose sales in the tied good mar-
ket, which could drive competitors out of the tied market. Whinston, supra at 840. The
U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed to the leverage theory as one reason to condemn cer-
tain tying arrangements. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 478 ("The alleged conduct—
higher service prices and market foreclosure—is facially anticompetitive and exactly the
harm that antitrust laws aim to prevent."); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13-14 ("We have
condemned tying arrangements when the seller has some special ability—usually called
'market power' —to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competi-
tive market"); id. at 36-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The antitrust law is properly con-
cerned with tying when, for example, the flour monopolist threatens to use its market
power to acquire additional power in the sugar market, perhaps by driving out competing
sellers of sugar, or by making it more difficult for new sellers to enter the sugar market.");
Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 508 ("[T]he seller can use his power over the tying product to win
customers that would otherwise have constituted a market available to competing produc-
ers of the tied product.").
162 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14; Fortner 495 U.S. at 509.
155 Sec Fortner I, 495 U.S. at 509; id. at 513 (White, J., dissenting) ("They must be pre-
pared not only to snatch existing sellers of the tied product in price and quality, but to
offset the attraction of the tying product itself.").
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cial system.'" In the past century, the U.S. Supreme Court has fluctu-
ated in its treatment of tying arrangements, accepting the practice
initially, completely reversing course, and then settling on its current
middle ground of condemning tying arrangements that meet certain
con ditions. 165
The following four conditions must be met for a court to condemn
a tying arrangement under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: (1) the pro-
ducer must sell two distinct products or services tied together,' (2) the
producer must possess substantial economic power over the tying prod-
164 See Meese, supra note 146, at 2-3. The scholarly literature on tying arrangements re-
flects the challenge facing courts. See id. See generally Victor H. Kramer, The Supreme Court
and Tying Arrangements: Antitrust as History, 69 MINN, L. REV, 1013 (1985) (explaining that
the scholarly debate regarding the legitimate objectives of antitrust law has affected the
Supreme Court's treatment of tying arrangements).
165 See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co„ 224 U.S. 1, 25-28, 31-32 (1912). In its 1912 decision in
Henry, the U.S. Supreme Court held the defendant liable for patent infringement because
the defendant used the patented machine with supplies purchased from competitors of
the patent owner, even though, in licensing the machine, the patent owner mandated that
the defendant purchase all supplies from the patent owner. Id. Although the Court did not
directly address the issue as a tying arrangement, a later case, Motion Pictures Patent Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., recognized the antitrust implications of Henry and implicitly over-
ruled Henry's upholding of the tying arrangement. See 243 U.S. 502, 512 (1917). Thirty-two .
years later, the U.S. Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. of California u United States held that
tying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition. 337
U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949). The Court backed off of this harsh treatment of tying arrange-
ments in Jefferson Parish, condemning tying arrangements only when the seller has some
special ability (market power) to force a purchaser to do something that he or she would
not do in a competitive market. 466 U.S. at 13-14. In its most recent tying case, the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized that its strong disapproval of tying arrangements had substan-
tially diminished over the years. Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 35.
It is also important to note that the U.S. Supreme Court has historically examined the
legality of tying arrangements using a per se test, by which it deems certain types of con-
tractual arrangements unreasonable as a matter of law. Id. at 35-38; Jefferson Parish, 466
U.S. at 9; Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 498; N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5. But many commentators have
criticized this approach because it allows the Court to forego any market analysis to de-
termine if the tying arrangement actually restricts competition, thus allowing courts to
condemn arrangements that might enhance competition or that can be justified on other
grounds. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 33-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also 9 PHILIP
E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS or ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICA-
TION I 1702 (1991) (criticizing the per se test because it inadequately defines "tying ar-
rangement" and is applied in very idiosyncratic ways). Because of these considerations, this
Note adopts an elemental test to place greater emphasis on the proof of market power and
injury to competition. See infra notes 166-169 and accompanying text.
166 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21-22; Fortner I, 394 U.S.
at 507.
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uct, 167 (3) the tying arrangement must injure competition, 168 and (4)
the tying arrangement must affect a substantial amount of commerce. 169
A. First Condition of an Illegal Tying Arrangement: The Producer Sells Two
Distinct Products or Services Tied Together
The first condition requires the seller to offer two separate prod-
ucts, rather than two components of a single product.'" This condi-
tion turns on the character of the consumer demand for the two
items, not on the functional relation between them."' For example, a
camera and its lens are components of the same product; a camera
and the film are two separate products. 172 Although a camera cannot
work without either the lens or the film, consumers have separate
demands for the camera and the film, but a single demand for the
camera with a lens, as they expect the camera to come with a lens.'"
Because the Sherman Act seeks to prevent sellers from exploiting
their market power in one product by forcing a customer to purchase
a separate product, this method of evaluation is appropriate because
it shifts the attention away from how the products are used and to-
ward how the two products are perceived by consumers. 174
Another component of the first condition requires that the seller
condition the purchase of the tying product on the purchase of the
tied product. 176 The customer only buys the tied product because he
must take it in order to obtain the desired product. 176 Consequently, if
each of the products may be purchased separately in a competitive
market, one seller's decision to sell the two products in one package
does not meet this condition of a tying arrangement.'" There is no
167 Ill. Tool 11brks, 547 U.S. at 34-38; Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462; Jefferson Parish, 466
U.S. at 13-14; U.S. Steel Corp. v. Former Enters., Inc. (Fortner II), 429 U.S. 610, 620-22
(1977); Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 502-04.
1155 See Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 36-38, 45; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 34-35, 38-40
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
169 Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 39; N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 11; Intl Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
175 Seelefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 18.
171 Id. at 19.
172 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 463.
173 See id. at 463; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19.
174 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19-21.
175 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462-63; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12.
' 76 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12.
"7 Id. at 11.
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tying problem when the buyer is free to take either product by itself,
even when the seller offers the two as a package at a single price) 78
B. Second Condition of an Illegal Tying Arrangement: The Producer Possesses
Substantial Economic Power Over the Tying Product
The second condition of an illegal tying arrangement requires that
the seller possess economic power over the tying product)" The U.S.
Supreme Court has defined market power as the power to force a pur-
chaser to do something that he or she would not do in a competitive
market, or, as an economic matter, the power to raise prices above the
levels that would be charged in a competitive market)80 Under either
definition, a seller with substantial economic power has some advan-
tage not shared by competitors in the market for the tying product 18 r
To determine the relevant market for antitrust purposes, a court
must make a factual inquiry into the "commercial realities" faced by
consumers, including the choices available to consumers in the tying
market)82
 If there are a number of substitutes available to the con-
sinner, competitive pressures will likely force the producer imposing a
tying arrangement to lose market share or abandon its tie)as The ty-
ing market, however, could also consist entirely of one brand of a
product as long as there are no reasonable substitutes for it. 184
For example, in its 1976 decision in Fortner Enterprises v. U.S. Steel
Copp, (Fortner II), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant could
possess sufficient economic power over the tying market if the tying
product was unique) 85
 The Court emphasized that uniqueness confers
economic power only when other competitors are in some way pre-
vented from offering the distinctive product themselves. 186
 In this case,
the defendant was accused of selling favorable credit (tying product)
on the condition that the buyer also purchase the defendant's pre-
manufactured homes (tied product)) 87
 The plaintiffs argued that the
178 N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6 n.4.
179 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13-14.
188
 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464; Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620; Fortner I, 394 U.S. at
503.
191
 See Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620.
182
 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481-82.
193
 Troy Paredes, Comment, Copyright Misuse and Tying: Will Courts Stop Misusing Mis-
use?, 9 Hinit not. L.J. 271,299 (1994).
104 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481-82.
185 Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 619-22.
ma Id. at 621 (citing Fortner l. 394 U.S. at 505).
187 Id. at 611-12.
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defendant offered unique credit because its mortgage loans covered
100% of the acquisition and development cost of real estate. 188 No
other lender in the geographic area could match these favorable
terms.] 89 Although the Court accepted the proposition that the plaintiff
could base market power on the uniqueness of the defendant's tying
product, the plaintiff could not prove uniqueness merely because the
defendant was willing to accept a lesser profit or incur greater risks
than ils competitors)" To establish sufficient power over the tying
product, the plaintiff needed to show that other competitors could not
offer the same favorable credit rates. 191
In another case decided in 1983, Jefferson Parish Hospital District
Number 2 v. Hyde, the U.S. Supreme Court took a more quantitative
approach to the market power condition, holding that the alleged
tying arrangement did not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act be-
cause the defendant did not possess sufficient market power over the
lying product. 192 There, the defendant was accused of compelling us-
ers of its hospital services (the tying product) to purchase the hospi-
tal's chosen anesthesia service (the tied product). 193 The plaintiffs ar-
gued that the defendant's hospital possessed substantial economic
power because it dominated the geographic area, and most patients
pick a hospital based on its proximity to their home)" Hence, the
plaintiffs argued that the hospital exploited its dominance in the local
area by forcing patients to purchase the hospital's chosen anesthesia
service. 195 The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument on the grounds
that the hospital's dominance over persons residing in the area was
far from overwhelming, given that seventy percent of the patients in
the area chose to go to other hospitals. 06 The hospital, in effect, had
no advantage over its competitors; if they really wanted alternate anes-
thesia services, patients could just go to another hospita1. 197
185 Id. at 615-16.
1119 Id.
19° Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 621-22.
iol Id. at 622; Fortner I. 394 U.S. at 505 11.2 ("[T] he real source of economic power is
not the product itself but rather the seller's cost advantage in producing it.").
192 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 26-29.
1" Id. at 8.
194
 Id. at 7-8.
199 Id.
196
 Id. at 26.
197 Sec Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 26-27.
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C. Third Condition of an Illegal Tying Arrangement: The Tying
Arrangement Injures Competition
The third condition requires that the tying arrangement injure
competition.'" Whereas courts examine economic power in the tying
product market, they examine the anticompetitive effect in reference
to the market for the tied product.' This distinction is important be-
cause it goes to the heart of what makes a tying arrangement illegal
tinder Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 2" An abuse of market power
through a tying arrangement can potentially injure both consumers
and producers in the tied market."' Tying arrangements injure compe-
tition if they use the tying product's market power to force consumers
to purchase the tied product not because of its merits, but because it is
necessary in the purchase of the tying product. 202 Furthermore, the
tying arrangement may take advantage of market failures arising out of
a consumer's inability to adequately assess the true costs of the tied
item.203 Anticompetitive effects also impact producers in the tied mar-
ket who face higher barriers to entry because they are forced to over-
come the attraction of the tying product in addition to competing on
the merits of the tied product. 2"
198 See Ill. Tool Wanks, 547 U.S. at 36-38, 45; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 33-35, 38-40
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Under this inquiry, it is appropriate to look at possible pro-
competitive justifications for the tying arrangement, in addition to the anticompetitive
effects. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 33-35.
199 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14.
200 See id.
2" See id. at 14-15.
202 See id. at 14.
203 See Grimes, supra note 154, at 267-68. The Chicago School argues that a tying ar-
rangement rarely injures competition because it is the equiinlent of a price increase on the
tying good. Sec Whinston, supra note 161, at 837-38 (summarizing the positions of Chicago
School commentators). Consumers, when deciding to purchase the tying good, can factor
the undesirable characteristics of the tied good into their decision. See id, Hence, any addi-
tional profits earned by the seller through the imposition of a tie are offset by the losses
that occur when a consumer decides not to purchase the tying good because of its high
"price." See id. This argument stands as long as consumers are able to accurately assess the
costs of the tied good. See Grimes, supra note 154, at 272-75. When information costs are
high, consumers may not be able to make this assessment accurately, and, thus, they make
a less than optimal decision, which sellers can exploit through the tying arrangement. Id.
204 See Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 512-14 (White, J., dissenting).
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D. Fourth Condition of an Illegal Tying Arrangement: Tying Arrangement
Affects a Substantial Volume of Commerce
The final condition requires that the tying arrangement affect a
substantial volume of trade. 205 As the Court in Jefferson Parrish held, "If
only a single purchaser were 'forced' with respect to the purchase of a
tied item, the resultant impact on competition would not be sufficient
to warrant the concern of antitrust law."206 Thus, to determine
whether a tying arrangement affects a substantial volume of trade, a
court must examine the amount of business foreclosed to competitors
of the tied product. 207 In its 1969 decision in Fortner Enterprises v. U.S.
Steel (Fortner I), the U.S. Supreme Court found that the foreclosure of
$9.1 million in total sales over three years was more than enough to
support the conclusion that the tying arrangement affected a substan-
tial volume of trade.208 In reaching its holding, the Court emphasized
that the policy of promoting free and open competition should guide
the inquiry. 2°8 A tying arrangement meets this condition as long as it
forecloses a substantial amount of business to exceed a de minimis
standard, thus affecting an unreasonable amount of commerce.210
In sum, illegal tying arrangements occur when producers exploit
their power in the tying good market to force consumers to purchase
a tied product, a transaction which injures competition in the tied
market. 211 Framing tying arrangements in this way accounts for the
harms to consumers, who make a less than optimal choice on the tied
good, and producers in the tied market, who must overcome the at-
traction of the tying good in addition to regular competition on the
merits. 212 Furthermore, it emphasizes the importance of anticompeti-
tive effects in order to distinguish benign tying arrangements from
those that violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 212
205 Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 39; N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 11; hal Salt, 332 U.S. at 396.
296 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16.
207 Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 501.
"a See id. at 502.
209 See id. at 501-02.
210 Id.
211 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12; Fortner 4 394 U.S.
at 512-13 (White, J., dissenting).
212 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12-14; Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 512 (White, J., dissent-
ing); Brociley, supra note 150, at 1032-35; Lande, supra note 158, at 93-96; Meese, supm
note 146, at 16.
215 See Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 36-38, 45; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 34-35, 38-40
(O'Connor, J., concurring),
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IV. THE DMCA AND THE IPHONE: LITTLE HOPE FOR CONSUMERS
When George Hotz first unlocked the iPhone, it seemed like a
victory for consumers, an escape from the confines of a rigid business
model that limited iPhone purchasers to the AT&T network. 214
 More-
over, it appeared to validate consumer rights under the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act (the "DMCA"). 215
 Although the DMCA was
meant to prevent consumers from circumventing technological de-
vices to access copyrighted works, the Librarian of Congress explicitly
granted an exemption for those who, like Hotz, circumvented "for the
sole purpose of lawfully connecting to a wireless telephone communi-
cation network."216
 The federal regulation seemed to affirm the right
of consumers to unlock their iPhones. 217
In reality, however, the DMCA provides little hope for consumers
in their quest to break free from AT&T. 218
 The wireless connection
exemption is severely limited as a legal weapon because it can only be
raised as a defense to copyright infringement, and it only applies to
individuals who circumvent copyright protection technology on their
own and not to those who help others circumvent such technology. 219
Furthermore, the case law interpreting the DMCA is ambiguous as to
whether consumers can legally unlock their phones.220
 This Part will
examine each of these limitations in turn.
A. Structural Limitations of the DMCA and the Wireless Connection Exemption
The structure of the DMCA provides two major obstacles to
iPhone purchasers who hope to use the wireless connection exemp-
tion to justify unlocking a cell phone. 221
 First, the purchaser can only
214 See Granick, supra note 5; Stone, supra note 6.
219
 See Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.); Librarian Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472, 68,476 (proposed Nov.
27, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201); Wu, supra note 5.
216 See Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1192-96 (Fed. Cir.
2004); S. REP. No. 105-190, at 11 (1998); Librarian Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,476;
supra notes 83-102 and accompanying text.
217 See Librarian Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,476; Copyright Register Recommen-
dation, supra note 105, at 48-52.
218 See Granick, supra note 5 (noting the ambiguities in applying the DMCA to cell
phone unlocking).
219 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000); infra notes 221-235 and accompanying text.
229 See Lexmark Inel, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 547-50
(6th Cir. 2004); Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1200-04; TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Dixon, 475 F.
Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (M.D. Fla. 2007); infra notes 236-250 and accompanying text.
221
 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a); Granick, supra note 5.
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raise the exemption as a defense to circumvention, which means that
consumers cannot simply demand that Apple and AT&T allow them
to bypass the Subscriber Identity Module ("SIM") card lock that binds
them to the AT&T network. 222 Section 1201(a) (1) (A) provides a
blanket prohibition on circumvention of technological measures that
control access to copyrighted works, and § 1201(a) (1) (C) authorizes
the Librarian of Congress to determine exceptions to that blanket
prohibition, namely whether that prohibition adversely impacts indi-
viduals' "ability to make noninfringing uses under this title of a par-
ticular class of copyrighted works."223 Section 1201(a) (1)(C) does not
authorize the Librarian to bar certain technological measures, but
rather to allow certain kinds of circumvention. 224 Consequently, when
the Librarian of Congress decided that individuals could make nonin-
fringing use of the "firmware that enables wireless telephone handsets
to connect to a wireless telephone communication network," she only
meant to allow circumvention of the software locks that controlled
access to the firmware. 225 The DMCA did not authorize her to declare
unlawful the use of those locks. 226
This distinction is important in the case of the iPhone. 227 The Li-
brarian's exemption may allow consumers to circumvent the iPhone
lock, but it does not prevent Apple and AT&T from initially using those
locks, which is what has led to the `cat and mouse' game referred to by
Steve jobs.228 Hackers will continue to unlock their iPhones, and Apple
will repeatedly disable unlocking software with new security updates. 229
Consumers, therefore, cannot take full advantage of their right to cir-
cumvent, despite the Librarian's determination that cell phone locks
222 Sec 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
228 Sce id.
224 See id. § 1201 (a) (1) (C); Librarian Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,472 ("The pur-
pose of the rulemaking proceeding conducted by the Register is to determine whether
users of particular classes of copyrighted works are, or in the next three years are likely to
be, adversely affected by the prohibition in their ability to make noninfringing uses of
copyrighted works.").
228 Librarian Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,476.
226 Sce 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1) (C).
227 See id.; Librarian Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,476; Netanel, supra note 17, at 87—
88; Keizer, Apple Plays Hardball, supra note 8.
228 See 17 .S.C. § 1201(a); Librarian Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,476; Netanel, su-
pra note 17, at 87-88; Keizer, Apple Plays Hardball, supra note 8.
229 see Keizer, Apple Plays Hardball, supra note 8; Keizer, iPhone Unlock Hackers, supra note
11. This Note does not attempt to decide whether hackers face contractual obligations that
might limit their ability to alter their iPhones, but, for further information, see generally
supra note 20 and accompanying text for a list of articles that do address the enforceability
of contracts with regard to copyright law.
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are access controls that have nothing whatsoever to do with the inter-
ests protected by copyright.230
The second major obstacle facing those wishing to unlock their
iPhones is that the exemption applies only to individual circumvent-
ers."' The second part of the anticircumven lion provision,
§ 1201(a) (2) (A), explicitly states that no person can "manufacture,
import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any tech-
nolog-y, product, service, device, component, or part thereof that ...
is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing"
an access control. 232 Unlike § 1201(a), there are no exceptions to this
prohibition. 233 Hence, the exemption allows George Hotz to unlock
his iPhone, but does not exempt him from liability for telling others
how to do 1034 The average consumer lacking a technical background
has little chance of unlocking his iPhone when those with software
experience cannot legally share their knowledge. 235
B. Limitations of Applying MICA Case Law to the Unlocking of the iPhone
Although software developers who publicize the methods for
unlocking iPhones may not qualify under the wireless connection ex-
emption, they could still argue that they trafficked in circumvention
technologies that did not violate the DMCA. 236
 Indeed, both Lexmark
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. and Chamberlain
Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc. rejected plaintiffs' claims under
the DMCA even though the defendants in each case trafficked in cir-
2" Librarian Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,476; supra notes 99-102, 106-109 and ac-
companying text. This result is expected given that the primary purpose of the DMCA is to
give producers a weapon to fight off circumvention in order to encourage them to distrib-
ute movies, music, software, and other copyrighted works in the digital format. See S. REP.
No. 105-190, at 1-2, 8-9; Netanel, supra note 17, at 84-85, 92. With this as the main focus,
the DMCA restricts the rights of consumers and can be used by producers to achieve ends
unrelated to copyright law. See Burk, Anticircumvention, supra note 103, at 1095-97;
McCardle, supra note 93, at 997-99.
231
 See 17 U.S.C.§ 1201(a); Librarian Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,472; Granick, su-
pra note 5.
232 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2) (A); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 441-
44, 459-60 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding lower court's injunction that barred defendant from
posting on an Internet website a method for circumventing a technological protection
measure that restricted DVDs from working on the Linux operating system).
233
	 17 U .S.C.§ 1201 (a) (2); Granick, supra note 5.
234
 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2); Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 441-44, 459-60; Gran-
ick, supra note 5.
233 Granick, supra note 5.
236 See Netanel, supra note 17, at 91-92; Granick, supra note 5.
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cumvention technologies. 237 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in Lexmark and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit in Chamberlain refused to allow the producers to exploit the
DMCA by embedding copyrighted software within access controls to
prevent their products from being used in conjunction with compet-
ing products.238 That said, each defendant in those cases won on the
ground that the purchase of the products authorized circumven-
tion. 239 Unlike the plaintiffs in Lexmark and Chamberlain, Apple and
AT&T did not authorize circumvention of the cell phone lock. 24°
Rather, they made it clear from the outset that purchasers of the
iPhone can only use the device on the AT&T network. 241 In this way,
Apple and AT&T did what Judge Merritt and other commentators
feared: they tweaked the way they sold a product so that they could
sustain a cause of action under the DMCA. 242
Hotz and other individuals offering circumventing technologies
could argue that the SIM card lock is not a protected work under
§ 1 201 (a) (2) (A) and that the DMCA therefore does not apply to
them.243 Congress intended the DMCA to prohibit piracy of copyright-
protected works such as movies, music, and computer programs. 244 The
mobile firmware within the iPhone's SIM card that allows users to con-
nect to a cellular network may qualify as a copyright protected work,
but Hotz and other unlockers have not circumvented the access control
237 See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 549-50; Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1202; supra notes 117-136
and accompanying text.
289 See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 549-50 (holding that the defendant did not violate
§ 1201(a)(2) by circumventing the microchip that controlled access to software in the
plaintiff's printers); Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1193, 1201-02 (holding that the defendant
did not violate § 1201 (a) (2) by trafficking in competing garage door opener transmitters
that circumvented the technological protection measure controlling access to the plain-
tiffs garage door opening device).
289 See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 546; Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1202.
240 iPhone Terms and Conditions, supra note 3; Wu, supra note 5.
241 See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 546, 549-50; Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1202; Wu, supra note 5
(explaining that, when a consumer begins to use an iPhone, he or she agrees, via an on-
screen contract, that "except as ... permitted by applicable law you may not ... reverse
engineer, tor] disassemble ... the iPhone Software"); iPhone Terms and Conditions, supra
note 3 ("Ali plans require a 2-year AT&T service agreement, an activation fee, and are
subject to AT&T credit approval.").
242 See Lexinath, 387 F.3d at 551-52 (Merritt, J., concurring); Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at
1201; McCardle, supra note 93, at 1017-18; supra notes 128, 142 and accompanying text.
243 Sec 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2) (A); Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 551-52 (Merritt, J., concur-
ring); Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1193, 1197-1202.
244 See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 551-52 (Merritt, J., concurring); Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at
1197-1202; S. REP, No. 105-190, at 1-2, 8-9; Librarian Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,476;
Netanel, supra note 17, at 77; supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
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protecting the firmware in order to pirate it. 245 They circumvented the
access control to utilize the mobile firmware to access alternate wireless
carriers, much like the defendant in Chamberlain circumvented the ac-
cess control to utilize embedded software to allow other garage door
transmitters to work with the plaintiffs garage door opener. 246
A court applying the DMCA to iPhone unlocking could reach the
same conclusion Judge Merritt did in his concurring opinion in Lex-
mark. 247 As Judge Merritt observed, the defendant did not circumvent
to pirate the plaintiff's copyrighted software, but rather to sell print
cartridges that could work with the plaintiff's printers. 248 If the plain-
tiff wanted to rely on the DMCA to protect its copyrighted works,
therefore, it should not have used such works to prevent competing
cartridges from working with its printers. 249 Similarly, if Apple and
AT&T want to rely on DMCA protections, they should not use the
mobile firmware in the SIM card to prevent. the iPhones from working
with competing carriers. 250
V. ILLEGAL TYING ARRANGEMENTS: BETTER CLAIM FOR iPHONE
UNLOCRERS
Although consumers cannot rely on copyright law to stop Apple
from including technological protection on the mobile firmware inside
545 See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 551-52 (Merritt, J., concurring): Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at
1193, 1197-98, 1201; Librarian Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,476; Granick, supm note 5.
248 See Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1201; Granick, supm note 5.
247 See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 551-52 (Merritt, J., concurring).
sots
248
 Id. at 552.
258 See id. In its 2007 decision in Tract-One Wireless, Inc. u Dixon, the U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Florida may have provided some hope to iPhone unlockers, but
the ultimate impact of that case is still ambiguous. See 475 F. Supp. 2d at 1238. In that case,
the court held that the wireless connection exemption did not apply because the defen-
dants unlocked prepaid phones to sell them for a profit, not for the sole purpose of lawfully
connecting to a competing network. Id. This holding seems to imply that the court would
have allowed the circumvention had the defendants not sold the phones for a profit, thus
providing legal support to consumers who unlock their iPhones for their own personal
use. See id. But, the court mistakenly overlooked the real reason the Librarian of Congress
inserted the phrase "sole purpose" into the exemption, namely to prevent circumvention
of technological measures that protected both mobile firmware and the copyrighted digital
media downloaded onto cell phones. See id.; Librarian Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,476.
Whereas the Librarian of Congress was concerned with the piracy of digital media, the
District Court of Florida was concerned with the defendants' selling the prepaid phones at
a premium and interfering with the plaintiff's business model. See TracFone, 475 F. Stipp. 2d
at 1238; Librarian Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,476. Hence, the court relied on an in-
jury to the plaintiff that falls outside the realm of copyright law, making it possible that a
court could do the same in the case of the iPhone. Cf. TractOne, 475 F. Supp. 2c1 at 1238.
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the iPhone, they can challenge the underlying business arrangement
between Apple and AT&T under antitrust law. 251 Both the U.S. Courts
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and for the Federal Circuit hinted at
the antitrust implications of using the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (the "DMCA") to restrict competition in secondary markets.252
Chamberlain even cited an antirust case for the proposition that the
DMCA, if strictly interpreted, could allow a company to leverage its
sales into aftermarket monopolies, a practice normally prohibited by
antitrust laws. 253 Testing the validity of this fear, however, requires a
careful examination of illegal tying arrangements. 254 This Part will ar-
gue that Apple and AT&T have formed an illegal tying arrangement by
conditioning the purchase of the iPhone (tying product) on the
agreement that the phone will only operate using AT&T's cellular ser-
vice (tied product). 255
A. First Condition of an Illegal Tying Arrangement: Apple Sells Two Distinct
Products or Services Tied Together
iPhone consumers meet the first condition of an illegal tying ar-
rangement because two separate products—the iPhone and AT&T's
wireless service—are tied together. 256 Cell phones and cell phone ser-
vice represent two distinct markets in the eyes of consumers, such that
231 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504
U.S. 451, 464-66, 472-77 (1992); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9-
12 (1984); In re Wireless Tel. Servs. Antitrust Ling., 385 F. Supp. 2d 403, 414-16, 419-20
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); Holman Complaint, supra note 12, 11 76-97, at 17-22; Smith Complaint,
supra note 12, 11 61-81, at 25-29.
232 See Lexmark Intl, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 551-52
(6th Cir. 2004) (Merritt, .1., concurring); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc.,
381 F.3d 1178, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
253 Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1201 (citing Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 455 for the proposi-
tion that the MICA. if strictly interpreted, could allow virtually any company to attempt to
leverage its sales into aftermarket monopolies, a practice that the antitrust laws normally
prohibit) .
$54 See id. Although the Federal Circuit in Chamberlain acknowledged the antitrust is-
sues implicated by the MICA, the court, understandably, did not examine the conditions
that make tying arrangements illegal, an analysis which requires more than just an "at-
tempt to leverage its sales into aftermarket monopolies." See id.; see also Jefferson Parish, 466
U.S. at 9-12 (providing an overview of the tying analysis and stating that not all tying ar-
rangements are anticompetitive); Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1201.
233 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 461; N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1958).
236 Sec Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19-22; Former En-
ters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fortner I), 394 U.S. 495, 507 (1969); supra notes 170-178 and
accompanying text.
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there is sufficient demand for cell phone service separate from the
demand for handsets. 257
 Cellular service companies conceded this
when consumers sued them for illegally tying service to handsets. 258
Independent of that that concession, iPhone purchasers still have
sufficient proof to satisfy this condition, particularly given the U.S. Su-
preme Court's 1992 decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Ser-
vices, Inc., where the Court held that replacement parts and repair ser-
vice for printers constituted two separate markets, even though the two
products were functionally linked. 259
 In that case, the printer manufac-
turer argued that because there was no demand for parts separate from
service, there cannot be separate markets for service and parts. 26° The
Court rejected that argument because it would force the Court to con-
clude that separate markets could never exist for cameras and film,
computers and software, or automobiles and tires. 261
Likewise, the iPhone may depend on cellular service to function,
but consumers can still distinguish between the market for cell phones
and the market for cell phone service. 262
 That consumers have gone
through the trouble of unlocking their iPhones demonstrates that they
demand cell phones separately from service. 263
 Moreover, the recent
announcements by Verizon and AT&T that they have opened their
networks to all handsets show that consumers distinguish between the
handset and service markets. 264
 In addition to showing that cell phones
and cell phone service occupy two different markets, iPhone consum-
ers also meet the first condition of an unlawful tying arrangement. be-
cause Apple mandates the use of the iPhone on AT&T's network. 265
257 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19-22; A Cellular Sea
Change, supra note 36 (explaining how Verizon has chosen to open its networks to other
cell phones); Wu, supra note 5.
258 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Consolidated Motion to Dis-
miss the Complaint at 12, Wireless Consumer Alliance, Inc. V. AT&T Cellular Servs. Inc.,
385 F. Supp. 2d 403, (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 02 Civ. 2637).
259 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462-63.
269 Id.
261 See id. at 963.
2" Sec id. at 462; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21-22; A Cellular Sea Change, supra note 36;
Wu, supra note 5.
265 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21-22; Stone, supra
note 6; Wu, supra note 5.
28'
	 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21-22; A Cellular Sea
Change, supra note 36; Cauley, supra note 90.
255 Smith Complaint, supra note 12,11 3-5,28, at 2, 6; Wu, supra note 5; iPhone Terms
and Conditions, supra note 3.
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B. Second Condition: Apple Possesses Substantial Economic Power in the
Market for the iPhone
Consumers also have a legitimate claim that Apple possesses sub-
stantial economic power in the market for the iPhone because it is the
only producer of the revolutionary device.266 Although it could be
considered just another cell phone or even another smart phone, the
iPhone transcends both of these labels and occupies a market of its
own. 267 It is more than a phone.268 It is a digital multimedia player,
Internet browser, and organizer. 269 Moreover, no other phone has
matched the iPhone's sleek beauty; earning Time Magazine's praise as
invention of the year. 27° Of course, none of this praise matters to the
analysis of market power unless it comes from consumers. 271 But, the
fact that 1.4 million iPhones sold in its first three months on the mar-
ket, at the hefty price tag of $599, is proof that consumers find the
product truly unique. 272
The crucial question is whether this uniqueness actually confers
sufficient economic power under the U.S. Supreme Court's test for
condemning tying arrangements. 273 The Court in its 1984 decision in
Jefferson Parish Hospital District Number 2 v. Hyde held that a defendant
possesses substantial power over the tying product when it can force
purchasers to do something that they would not do in a competitive
market, a test that is easily met in the case of the iPhone. 274 In addi-
tion to compelling millions of consumers to fork over hundreds of
dollars for a phone when most other phones sell for much less, Apple
also forced consumers to accept a two-year service contract with
AT&T, an obligation that has disappointed many consumers. 275 Al-
though the existence of the tie, in itself, cannot prove market power
over the tying product, it is further evidence supporting the consum-
266 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13-18; U.S. Steel
Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc. (Fortner II), 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977); Fortner 1, 394 U.S. at
505; Paredes, supra note 183, at 299; supra notes 179-191 and accompanying text.
267 See Grossman, supra note 60, at 60; Mossberg, Blackjack, supra note 60; Vogelstein,
supra note 27, at 122, 125; supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
266 See Grossman, supra note 60, at 60; Mossberg, Blackjack, supra note 60; Vogelstein,
supra note 27, at 122, 125.
269 Apple iPhone, littp://www.apple.rom/iplione (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
270 Grossman, supra note GO, at 60; Mossberg, Blackjack, supra note 60.
271 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482; Paredes, supra note 183, at 299.
272 See Garrity, SUp717 note 68; Graham, iPhone's Future, supra note 68.
273 SeeJefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13-14, 17, 27; Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620-22.
274 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13-14, 17, 27.
275 See iPhone Terms and Conditions, supra note 3; see also supra note 72 and accompa-
nying text.
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ers' claim that the lure of the iPhone was too strong to resist. 276
 John
Canning, for example, purchased an iPhone even though AT&T of-
fers no wireless service in his home state of Vermont. 277
Canning may have acted irrationally in his purchase of the
iPhone, but that does not detract from consumers' claims that Apple
possesses substantial economic power, as the "commercial realities"
faced by consumers are what matter when assessing market power. 278
Certainly, courts must be careful not to condemn tying arrangements
when the plaintiff has only proven market power in some abstract
sense, but that outcome is not likely with the iPhone, 279
 Even if the
relevant market is expanded to include other smart phones, the
iPhone still possesses a uniqueness that satisfies the U.S. Supreme
Court's definition of market power. 280
 In 1977, the Court held in
Fortner Enterprises v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fortner II) that the plaintiff could
prove market power based on the uniqueness of the tying product
offered by the defendant, as long as the plaintiff could show that the
uniqueness derived from some cost advantage not available to com-
petitors."' Apple has an advantage that no other competitor can
match: it can authorize the iPhone to play music or videos from Ap-
276 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 25-27.
477 Silverman, supra note 4.
278
 See Eastnu2n Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481-82 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 572 (1966)); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13-14, 17; Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620;
Fortner 1, 394 U.S. at 503-04; Paredes, supra note 183, at 299.
279 See 466 U.S. at 26-27. In Jefferson Parish, the Court held that a 30% market share in
the tying market was not enough, absent other evidence, to prove market power over the
tying product. See id. Although the most recent analysis of the smart phone market shows
that the iPhone has obtained a 27% market share, that does not necessarily mean that
consumers cannot prove Apple has market power over the tying product. See id. at 17. As
the Court in Jefferson Parish further explained, market power can be proved either by show-
ing that the seller's share of the market is high or that the seller offers a unique product
that competitors are unable to offer. See id. The most recent U.S. Supreme Court decision
on tying, Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., does not affect consumer's ability to
prove market power through the unique product test, even though it overruled a long-
standing presumption that a patent on the tying product confers sufficient market power.
547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006). The Court may be moving away front presuming market power
without rigorous market analysis, but a plaintiff should still he able to prove market power
by showing that the tying product has no reasonable substitutes. See id.: Fortnerll, 429 U.S.
at 622. Furthermore, there is no need to rule out the possibility that the iPhone will even-
tually dominate the smart phone market, given that it took over 27% of the market in just
three months, and given that sales are expected to continue to grow at unprecedented
rates. See Garrity, supra note 68; Vaughn. supra note 69.
286 See Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620-22.
281 Sec id.
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pie's iTunes Music Store. 282
 This is important because Apple's iTunes
Music Store dominates the market for downloadable digital music. 285
Any consumer looking to buy a new cell phone with media capabili-
ties will likely look for the one phone that is compatible with his or
her library of downloads and can download songs directly from
iTunes. 284 The iPhone is the only smart phone that qualifies.288
C. Third Condition: The Tying of the iPhone to AT&T's Cellular Service
Results in Anticompetitive Effects in. the Market far Cellular Service
By conditioning the purchase of the iPhone on the acceptance of
a service contract with AT&T, Apple and AT&T have injured competi-
tion in the cellular service market, harming both consumers and pro-
ducers. 288 On the consumer side, the two companies have forced
inane purchasers to make a less than optimal buying decision re-
garding their cellular service. 287 Consumers have made it emphatically
clear that they are disappointed with AT&T's service. 288 hi a freely
competitive market where the iPhone tying arrangement did not ex-
ist, many consumers would have chosen AT&T's competitor on the
GSM network, T-Mobile, evidenced by the fact that consumers have
invested so much time unlocking the iPhone and risking its disable-
ment. 289 Furthermore, consumers have a viable argument that Apple
282 See id.; Smith Complaint, supra note 12, 1 34, at 7; Vogelstein, supra note 27, at 123-
24; supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. The Motorola ROKR can play songs from
iTunes but can only play up to 100 songs, whereas the iPhone can hold thousands of songs
in its 8 gigabyte version. Vogelstein, supra note 27, at 123-24.
288 Smith Complaint, supra note 12, 1 34, at 7; Netanel, supra note 17, at 78; Quinn, su-
pra note 4.
284 See Muir, supra note 77 (quoting one customer expressing her desire for the
iPhone because it contains all the capabilities of an iPod); Vogelstein, supra note 27, at 124.
288 Smith Complaint, supra note 12,1 34, at 7; Netanel, supra note 17, at 79-80.
286 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 477-78; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 11-14; Fortner I,
394 U.S. at 512 (White, J. , dissenting); Brodley, supra note 150, at 1032-35; Lande, supra
note 158, at 93-96; Meese, supra note 146, at 16; SUPM notes 198-204 and accompanying
text.
287 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12; Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 512 (White, J., dissenting);
Grimes, supra note 154, at 272-75.
288 See Grossman, supra note 60, at 60; Quinn, supra note 4; Samavati, supra note 72;
Silverman, supra note 4; supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. In general, AT&T has
developed a reputation of dropping too many calls and providing a slow data network, two
factors that certainly helped it achieve the second-to-last spot on a customer satisfaction
ranking of the wireless service industry. See Grossman, supra note 60, at 60; Quinn, supra
note 4; Samavati, supra note 72; Silverman, supra note 4.
289 See Smith Complaint, supra note 12, 11 38-42, at 9; Grossman, supra note 60, at 60;
Quinn, supra note 4, at 3; Samavati, supra note 72; Wu, supra note 5.
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could have brought the iPhone to market, without its revenue sharing
arrangement with AT&T. 299
 With purchasers lining up at stores to pay
for the product and not the service, it appears that Apple could have
done just as well without tying consumers to AT&T's service."'
Consumers could also argue that the iPhone tying arrangement
injured competition by exploiting consumers' lack of information. 292
Although they could have invested time and money comparing vari-
ous cellular providers before purchasing the iPhone, consumers still
had no way of accurately assessing the true costs of AT&T's service at
the tiine of sale, given that cellular service is an "experience good"
that the consumer must purchase in order to assess its quality. 293
 The
consumers' purchase of the iPhone, therefore, was much like the pur-
chase of the defendants' printers in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Techni-
cal Services, Inc., where the U.S. Supreme Court condemned the de-
fendant's tying arrangement on the grounds that it took advantage of
buyers' high information costs. 294
 In that case, the buyers did not
know that the defendant would eventually force the buyers to pur-
299 See Peters. supra note 1. One of the critiques of the U.S. Supreme Court's condem-
nation of tying arrangements is that tying arrangements can sometimes facilitate price
discrimination, which has the procompetitive effect of allowing the seller to increase out-
put of the tying product by offering it at a lower price. See Meese, supra note 146, at 27-28.
In some sense, cellular service providers made this argument when they defended the
practice of packaging service with handsets by arguing that the packaging subsidizes the
cost of cell phones, so that lower income consumers have an easier time purchasing
phones. See Wireless Tel. Serus. Antitrust Litig., 385 F. Supp. 2d at 410; Hahn et al., supra note
28, at 418-20. In the case of the iPhone, however, Apple's revenue sharing agreement with
AT&T may have provided further incentive to develop the revolutionary device and then
sell it at a more affordable level. See Peters, supra note 1 (describing how consumers waited
in line for the iPhone). Given the fact that customers were waiting in line to purchase the
product at a $599 price tag, it appears that Apple had adequate incentive to release the
iPhone with or without AT&T's help. See id. •
291 See Graham, Who're Mania, supra note 61.
292 See supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.
293
 See Grimes, supra note 154, at 273 (defining an experience good as one that the
consumer must purchase and experience before assessing). Of course, all cell phone ser-
vice contracts are experience goods, but it is much easier for a consumer to get out of a
regular service contract they do not like than it is for an &hone purchaser to get out of
their contract with AT&T because the iPhone purchaser has made a substantial investment
in the device, which will only work on AT&T's service for at least five more years. See
Grimes, supra note 159, at 273-74; Netanel, supra note 17, at 79-80. Consequently, markets
for experience goods may be competitive on their own because consumers can free them-
selves from an undesirable choice and go to another competitor. See Grimes, supra note
154, at 273-74. But when the experience good is tied to a product like the iPhone, the
market for the experience good may not be competitive because consumers are locked
into their less-than-optimal choices. See id.
294 See Eastma n Kodak, 509 U.S. at 473-74; supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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chase repair services from the defendant, rather than going to
cheaper independent service organizations. 295 With the iPhone, con-
sumers may have known that AT&T was the exclusive service provider,
but they did not know how bad the service would be. 296 This might
ultimately hurt iPhone sales in the long run as consumers may stop
buying it because of AT&T's poor service, but that still does not justify
why millions of consumers are now locked in for succumbing to the
lure of the iPhone. 297
These less than optimal decisions ultimately end up hurting
AT&T's competitors in the cell phone service market. 298 hi an industry
where there are already high harriers to entry, AT&T's exclusive deal
with Apple has made it even harder for new firms to enter the market
because they not only have to compete on the merits of their cellular
service, but they also have to overcome the attraction of the iPhone. 299
AT&T, on the other hand, does not have to worry about improving its
service, as its revenues rise with each new iPhone customer. 300 Although
295 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 455, 473-78; PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell,
Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 820 (6th Cir. 1997).
2" See Grimes, supra note 154, at 273-74; Silverman, supm note 4, at 4B. Again, this is
based on the argument that consumers were overcome by their attraction to the iPhone
and therefore did not take the time to adequately assess the quality of AT&T's service,
resulting in an anticompetitive harm. See Grimes, supra note 154, at 273-74; Silverman.
supra note 4, at 4B.
297 Cf. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473, 476-78. One commentator has expressed similar
sentiments: ''The hundreds of millions of consumers who are not AT&T Wireless custom-
ers could not make use of the iPhone unless they become AT&T customers. The question
is, why? Why can't you just buy a cell phone and use it on any network, like a normal
phonerWu, supra note 21, at 395.
298 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14; Fortner 1, 394 U.S. at 508-09; Times-Picayune
Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
299 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14; Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 508; id. at 513 (White, J. dis-
senting).
300 AT&T may have had to make investments in its services to get the iPhone contract,
but those improvements have not translated into an improved consumer experience. See
Seitz, supra note 73. Customers still profess their hatred for the company, and business ana-
lysts acknowledge that users face dropped calls, poor sound quality, and slow Internet ac-
cess. See id.; see also van Beijnum, supra note 72 (describing AT&T's attempted improve-
ments); Posting of TEX to I Hate My iPhone, supra note 76 (blogger professing hatred).
Furthermore, it seems likely that AT&T won the iPhone contract not because of its supe-
rior service, but because it was willing to pay more in the form of a generous revenue shar-
ing agreement and relinquishing control, two factors that do not provide consumers with
any direct benefit. See Vogelstein, supra note 27, at 122. Unless Apple pressures AT&T,
AT&T has less incentive to improve its service because it is already guaranteed to be the
sole service provider of the iPhone for the next five years. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14;
Vogelstein, supra note 27, at 122 (referring to the five-year exclusive dealing contract be-
tween Apple and AT&T); cf. Wu, supra note 21, at 395-98 (explaining how the regulations
that allowed consumers to use whatever device they wanted with their land lines yielded
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other carriers had the opportunity to bid for the deal with Apple, con-
sumers have a valid argument that competition in the cellular service
market would best be served if firms had to compete for iPhone pur-
chasers directly."' That type of beneficial competition would arise if
consumers could unlock their iPhones." 2
D. Fourth Condition: Apple and AT&T's Tying Arrangement Affects a
Substantial Amount of Commerce
Perhaps the easiest of the four conditions to prove, this condition
requires consumers to prove that the iPhone tying arrangement affects
a substantial amount of commerce. 303 As the Court explained in Jefferson
Parish, if the tying arrangement only forced a single consumer to pur-
chase the tied item, the resulting impact on competition would not be
sufficient to warrant the concern of antitrust law. 504 This is not a prob-
lem in the case of the iPhone, where every purchaser agrees to the ser-
vice contract with AT&T."5 Furthermore, as of 2007's third quarter, the
tying arrangement has affected 1.4 million consumers, a figure that cor-
responds with a $10.9 billion sales boost for AT&T, who now has the
most wireless subscribers among all U.S. phone companies. 506
 A court
would have a hard time holding that the foreclosure of more than 1.4
million consumers from the cellular service market was not substantial,
particularly in light of the tying arrangement's anticompetitive effects."
E. Normative Implications of the Apple-AT&T Tying Arrangement
The Apple-AT&T tying arrangement reveals a major problem in
technological industries generally and the cell phone industry specifi-
both expected and unexpected innovations in the telecommunications equipment mar-
ket). This result is what the U.S. Supreme Court feared would happen if a tying arrange-
ment was allowed to 'insulate" the tied product from the competitive stresses of the open
market. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13-14; Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 605.
301 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13-14; Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 508; id. at 512 (White, J.,
dissenting); Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 605.
5°2 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13-14; Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 508; id. at 512 (White, J.,
dissenting); Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 605; N. Par. Ry., 356 U.S. at 4; Brodley, supra note
150, at 1023 ("[A]ntitrust policy enunciates a distinct economic objective—a blending of
efficiency and consumer welfare—to be achieved by a particular social instrumentality—
in terfirm rivalry.").
3°3 See Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 39; N. Par. Ry., 356 U.S. at 11; Intl Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947); supra notes 205-213 and accompanying text.
304 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16.
3°5 Smith Complaint, supra note 12,11 3-4, 28, at 2, 6; Netatiel, supra note 17, at 79-80.
306 See Graham, iPhone's Future, supra note 68; Krause, AT&T Growth, supra note 49.
307 See Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 501-02.
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cally.3°3
 As producers like Apple improve their ability to restrict the use
of their products through software locks and license agreements, inno-
vative and potentially beneficial products facilitate anti-competitive be-
havior, ultimately harming consurners. 369 The iPhone may have an-
swered consumer demand for cell phones in a revolutionary way, but it
simultaneously hurt consumers by impeding competition in the wire-
less service market. 310
On an even more fundamental level, the iPhone represents an ex-
ploitation of the common consumer. 311 The glitz of the iPhone and the
allure of the Apple brand overshadowed the deficiencies of AT&T's
service.312 This does not mean that iPhone purchasers were dim-witted,
that Apple tricked consumers, or that the law needs to overprotect ig-
norant consumers. 3 t 3 It does mean, however, that Apple and AT&T in-
terfered with consumers' decision making, 314 prevented them from en-
joying the full utility of the iPhone, 30 and deprived them of the
benefits of increased competition in the wireless market. 316
To be certain, the wireless market might ultimately reflect the de-
cisions of the few consumers who carefully weighed the downside of
AT&T's service against the upside of the iPhone, thus eliminating the
need for judicial intervention. 317 Yet, it does not follow that this market
response will occur quickly enough to maximize competition in the cell
308 See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 551-52 (Merritt, J., concurring); Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at
1201; Burk, Aruicircumverttion, supra note 103, at 1110; Grimes, supra note 154, at 266-67.
366 See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 551-52 (Merritt, J., concurring); Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at
1201; Grimes, supra note 154, at 266-67; Netanel, supra note 17, at 77-80; cf. Eastman Ko-
dak, 504 U.S. at 473,476-78.
310 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 477-78; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 11-14; Fortner 1,
394 U.S. at 512 (White, J., dissenting); Brodley, supra note 150, at 1032-35; Linde, supra
note 159, at 93-96; Meese, supra note 146, at 16; supra notes 198-204,298-302 and ac-
companying text.
311 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12; Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 512 (White, J., dissenting);
Grimes, supra note 154. at 272-75; Silverman, supra note 4.
312 See Peters, supra note 1; Samarati, supra note 72; Vogelstein, supra note 27, at 125;
supra notes 60-79 and accompanying text.
313 See Grimes, supra note 154, at 273-74; Netanel, supra note 17, at 79-80.
See Grimes, supra note 154, at 273-74; Netanel, supra note 17, at 79-80; supra notes
276-280,293-298 and accompanying text.
515 See Grossman, supra note 60; Mossberg, Blackjack. supra note 60; Quinn, supra note
4; Suzukamo, supra note 4; Vogelstein, supra note 27, at 122, 125; supra notes 72-79 and
accompanying text.
316 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14; Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 508; id. at 513 (White, J. dis-
senting); Krause, AT&T Growth, supra nate 49; supra notes 298-302 and accompanying
text.
3t7 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 35-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Meese, supra note
146, at 23-24; Paredes, supra note 183, at 299.
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phone industry in the interim 318
 Untying the Apple-AT&T relation-
ship, however, would facilitate competition in the service market by giv-
ing consumers the freedom to choose the service that best meets their
demand after their initial purchase decision.319 With this increased
flexibility, the cellular service market could respond faster to changing
consumer preferences, ultimately reducing the harmful impact created
by the informational deficiencies that exist at the time of purchase 32°
Because antitrust laws are meant to increase competition and enhance
the quality of consumer demand, it makes good policy sense for a court
to condemn business models that prey on consumers' lack of informa-
tion and lock them into undesirable situations. 321
CONCLUSION
The iPhone tying arrangement demonstrates that the Sixth Cir-
cuit in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. and
the Federal Circuit in Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink. Technologies,
Inc. were correct in their fears that producers can use technological
locks to achieve anticompetitive purposes. More importantly, the
iPhone tying arrangement shows how consumers (and courts) should
not look toward copyright law to free themselves from these locks.
Although Congress may have passed the anticircumvention provisions
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act for the benefit of producers
and consumers, that law cannot operate as an offensive weapon for
consumers to use against the unfair business models employed by Ap-
ple and AT&T with regard to the iPhone. Consumers can, of course,
alter the products they purchase to work the way they desire, but, in
the digital world, the seller can always fight back, much like Apple did
when the iPhone was unlocked. Hence, arguing that the seller has
used an anticircumvention lock to protect an illegal tying arrange-
ment is the best avenue for consumers to challenge the iPhone-AT&T •
arrangement and similar schemes.
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